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ABSTRACT 
 
Preethika Seshasainam: Consumer Options and Forward Pricing - Theory And Empirical 
Analyses In Ticket Markets 
 (Under the direction of Sridhar Balasubramanian and Barry L. Bayus) 
 
 Sports markets are lucrative. Most sports markets have one or more elimination-style 
tournament in which individuals or teams compete. Currently tickets to these games are sold in 
advance. Inherently, in these games there is uncertainty regarding the teams that will ultimately 
participate in the event. Because tickets are sold in advance, fans who want to wait and buy 
tickets after they know which teams are playing in the game need to head to scalpers. Since 
scalpers can charge exorbitant prices, many fans are irate at the leagues for not doing anything 
about them.  Further, the presence of scalpers suggests that the leagues are leaving money on the 
table.  Thus, it seems that there are reasons why both fans and leagues might not be happy with 
the current practice. In this dissertation I propose alternative pricing mechanisms which give the 
fan the choice of waiting before buying the ticket while simultaneously giving the league more 
profits.  
 Essay 1 suggests that the league offer “consumer options”. Initially defined in the finance 
literature, buying an option confers a right, but not an obligation, to follow through on some 
course of action. I examine this pricing mechanism both from the fans’ and the league’s 
perspectives. 
iii 
Essay 2 is aimed at empirically understanding fan behavior in a real-life forwards market for 
sports tickets. A consumer forward is different from a consumer option in that it is team-specific 
(i.e., if the team for which the forward is bought does not make it to the final game, the forward 
expires). Given that forwards expire, it becomes crucial to ‘pick’ the right team when buying 
forwards. I study the problem of how fans can maximize their chances of attending the final 
game while simultaneously minimizing their cost and suggest recommendations based on fan 
type. 
 Essay 3 studies the concept of consumer forwards using an analytical model and 
experimental data. Further I contrast the profitability of option versus forward pricing.  
 Taken together the three essays suggest alternate ways of pricing tournament tickets and 
assess their profitability for the league while simultaneously understanding fan behavior in these 
markets. 
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 CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION: 
 
  This dissertation addresses new pricing mechanisms in markets where (a) there is 
temporal uncertainty regarding the quality of the purchased offering, and (b) consumers are 
affected differently by the uncertainty. In situations where purchase is separated from 
consumption, consumers are uncertain of the valuation for the product at the time of purchase. 
Under some situations, such uncertainty is more at the market-level as opposed to the consumer-
level (i.e., the uncertainty is not in the hands of the consumer). For example, consumers may be 
uncertain if a particular technology may succeed. Further, this market-level uncertainty could 
affect different types of consumers differently. For the purposes of the dissertation I focus on the 
context of sports markets, which can exhibit all of these properties. 
 Sports markets are lucrative. Total ticket revenues for the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games were 
almost $500 million. Most sports markets have one or more elimination-style tournaments in 
which individuals or teams compete. Currently tickets to these games are sold in advance. 
Inherently, in these games there is uncertainty regarding the teams that will ultimately participate 
in the event. Because tickets are sold in advance, fans who want to wait and buy tickets after they 
know which teams are playing in the game need to head to scalpers. Because most scalpers 
charge exorbitant prices, many fans are irate at the leagues for not doing anything about them.  
Further, the presence of scalpers suggests that the leagues are leaving money on the table.  Thus, 
it seems that there are reasons why both fans and leagues might not be happy with the current 
pricing practice. In this dissertation, I propose and study the viability of alternative pricing 
2 
mechanisms which give fans the opportunity to decide whether to attend the game after the 
uncertainty of the teams playing in the final is resolved. Simultaneously, these new pricing 
mechanisms provide the league with greater profit than the currently employed mechanism of 
advance selling. 
  In chapter 1, I propose that the league offer ‘consumer options.’ Initially defined in the 
finance literature, buying an option confers a right, but not an obligation, to follow through on 
some course of action. With consumer options, the firm decides on the option and exercise prices 
before the final outcome is known using estimates of consumers’ expected values for the 
offering.  Given these prices, a consumer can then take an option on a ticket by paying the option 
price before the uncertainty is resolved. Later, once the final outcome is known, the consumer 
can choose to exercise the option by paying the exercise price. If she does not exercise the 
option, it expires and the firm retains the option price. In this chapter I analytically model the 
viability of consumer options and contrast it with (a) advance selling and (b) pricing after the 
uncertainty has been resolved (“full information” pricing). I demonstrate that when the league 
uses option pricing, profits can equal or exceed those from the current practice of advance 
selling. I also demarcate conditions under which option pricing delivers profits that are equal to, 
and in some cases higher than profits that would be obtained under full information pricing. 
Further, I conduct a study to examine fan reactions to the newly proposed pricing mechanism. I 
also obtain their willingness-to-pay for tickets under the different pricing mechanisms and study 
the behavioral determinants of their willingness-to-pay. Fans gained more surplus when they 
bought an option ticket as opposed to a ‘regular’ ticket, because of the protection and flexibility 
offered by the former. I empirically validate the profitability conditions outlined in the analytical 
model. The percentage improvement in profits under option pricing over those under advance 
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selling was found to be the highest when the probability of the favorite team making it to the 
tournament was the lowest. This finding highlights the value of consumer options in protecting 
the fan from making a substantial investment upfront when the probability of the preferred 
outcome is low.  
  Chapter 2 is aimed at empirically understanding fan behavior in a real-life forward 
market for sports tickets. A consumer forward is team-specific. If a consumer is interested in 
attending a game in which her favorite team is playing, she could purchase the team’s forward by 
paying a preset “forward price.” Similar to the option ticket, if the fan’s favorite team makes it 
past the preliminary rounds and all the way to the tournament, she then pays an additional 
exercise price to buy the ticket. However, unlike in the option pricing case, if the specific team 
for which the forward was purchased does not make it to the tournament the fan loses the 
forward price. In other words, if the team for which the forward is bought does not make it to the 
final game, the forward expires. I obtained data from a large, well-known firm that sells 
consumer forwards for the Final Four market in 2006. This firm has a proprietary market; at any 
time in between the purchase of the forward and until the uncertainty is revealed fans have 
access to this market in which they can resell their forwards. I account for the presence of 
different types of fans in the market and estimate different models to understand their behaviors. 
While some fans engage in transactions on a single team, others buy and resell forwards across 
many different teams. The first group of fans tends not to resell their team’s forward, irrespective 
of its performance. I assume the objective of this group is to reduce its costs when purchasing 
forwards. Consequently, I estimate a regression model that provides insights on cost-
minimization strategies for this group. For the second group that transacts across many different 
teams, I study factors that help the fans pick the ‘right’ teams to buy forwards on. This is 
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especially important given that forwards expire if the specific team does not make it to the final. 
If the forward expires fans lose: (a) the forward price that they paid and (b) the chance to attend 
the game. I study the factors that help the second group maximize their chances of attending the 
final game while simultaneously minimizing their cost. Further, I draw from closely related 
literature on risk-management in financial markets to create independent variables that determine 
whether some of the accepted results on risk-management for individual investors in financial 
markets apply to fans minimizing risk in sports markets. I identify the risk-minimization 
strategies that transfer from financial to consumer markets and those that do not. 
  In chapter 3 I study the concept of forward pricing using an analytical model. As stated 
earlier forwards are tied to a specific team and expire if the given team does not make it. In this 
chapter, I allow for some fans to buy multiple forwards to maximize their chances of going to the 
game. I determine the conditions under which profits from forward pricing exceed that from 
pricing later in the season. Further, profits from forward pricing always exceed that from 
advance selling. I conduct a study across two universities to obtain fans willingness-to-pay under 
the different pricing mechanisms. Empirically, I demonstrate that profitability of forward pricing 
is always greater than advance selling. This is interesting because buying the regular ticket in 
advance permits the fan to attend any game of her choice whereas the forward ticket is a ‘lesser’ 
ticket in that it only permits the fan to attend the game if the team that is associated with the 
forward makes it to the final game. To better understand fans’ perceptions of forward pricing, I 
obtain open-ended feedback from them. Surprisingly, I find that one group of fans values the fact 
that a forward is a ‘lesser’ ticket. Because forwards expire if the team associated with it does not 
make it through, it relieves stress for fans who do not have to go through the hassle of resale. I 
compare profits from forward pricing with those from pricing later in the season and find that 
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when the probability of at least one of the two teams making it to the final is low, the 
profitability of forwards is higher. This is intuitive because when the probability of a team 
making it to the final is low, the value of the forward is higher. Finally, I contrast the profitability 
of option versus forward pricing. I find that if the market is composed entirely of fans who have 
no utility for any team except their favorite one, then forward pricing is just as profitable as 
option pricing. Such fans will not exercise either the option or the forward if their favorite team 
does not play in the final game. If, however, the market has another type of fan – one who is 
willing to attend any game, then the profitability of forward versus option pricing depends on the 
utility of the fans in this group. If their utility is high enough they could purchase multiple 
forwards to increase their chances of attending the game – something they do not need to do 
under option pricing. In this case profits from forward pricing are higher; else profit from option 
pricing could be higher than those from forward pricing.  
 Taken together the three chapters suggest new and interesting ways of incorporating fans’ 
uncertainties into the sport league’s ticket pricing decisions and help us better understand fan 
behavior. Specifically, I demonstrate that the proposed pricing mechanisms are more profitable, 
and more general, than the current practice of advance selling. Further, using option and forward 
pricing, the league can continue to set prices early in the season. I have also studied these pricing 
mechanisms from the perspective of the fans and found that they value the flexibility these new 
pricing mechanisms provide. Analyzing fan behavior by studying their transactions in a real-life 
market for forwards yields some new perspectives on their behavior. Overall, my dissertation 
employs a combination of analytical and empirical methodologies to demonstrate that option and 
forward pricing mechanisms are preferred – from the perspectives of both the sport league and 
the fans. 
 CHAPTER 2: 
CONSUMER OPTIONS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO 
TOURNAMENT TICKET PRICING 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sports markets are lucrative. Depending on the set of events taken into account, estimates 
of the size of the total annual market for sports and event tickets vary from $7 billion to $60 
billion (Happel and Jennings 2002). As an example, ticket revenues for the 2000 Sydney 
Olympic Games were almost $500 million (Preuss 2002). The National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) had over $500 million in revenues during the 2005-6 season with Division 
I men’s basketball tickets alone accounting for more than $27 million (Alesia 2006).  
Most sports markets have one or more elimination style tournaments in which individuals 
and/or teams compete. For example, “March Madness” hits college campuses across the United 
States every year as basketball teams compete to reach the Final Four tournament on their way to 
the NCAA Championship.  A key characteristic of this setting is the considerable uncertainty 
about which competitors (teams, hereafter) will actually make it through the tournament to the 
final game1. Consumers (fans, hereafter) have uncertain future valuations for tournament tickets 
because they do not know which teams will be playing until the tournament unfolds. Today, the 
                                                 
1
 For example, of the twenty-eight teams that made it through to the men’s Final Four tournament in the last seven 
years only six teams have made it there more than once (i.e., it was the first appearance in the Final Four for twenty-
two teams). Of the twenty teams that made it to the Super Bowl in the last ten years, only three teams have appeared 
more than once.  And, of the twenty-four teams that have made it to the Soccer World Cup semi-finals in the last 
twenty years only five teams have appeared more than once.  
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firm (league, hereafter) prices and sells tournament tickets at the beginning of the season, 
which is well in advance of the actual tournament that is at the end of the season.  Thus, the 
league’s current behavior is consistent with the “advance pricing” literature (Geng, et al. 2007; 
Shugan and Xie 2000; 2004; 2005; Xie and Shugan 2001). Unfortunately, this practice means 
that many fans who would like to attend the final championship game once they know the teams 
that are playing will be disappointed because tickets are typically sold out in advance. 
 In this chapter, I propose an alternative pricing arrangement whereby the league can earn 
greater profits than through its current practice of advance selling.  I borrow some ideas from the 
literature on real options to introduce the concept of consumer options.  Specifically, an option 
confers upon the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to follow through on some course of 
action (Amran and Kulatilaka 1999).  Whereas the literature on real options generally deals with 
the situation in which a firm strategically creates options for itself (e.g., Luehrman 1998; Amran 
and Kulatilaka 1999), the concept of consumer options involves a firm pricing and selling an 
option to consumers.  With consumer options, the firm decides on the option and exercise prices 
before the final outcome is known using estimates of consumer expected value.  Given these 
prices, a consumer can then take an option on a ticket by paying the option price before the 
uncertainty is resolved. Later, once the final outcome is known, the consumer can choose to 
exercise the option by paying the exercise price. If she does not exercise the option, it expires 
and the firm retains the option price.  Table 1 further highlights the concept of consumer options 
and how it differs from real options2. 
 
                                                 
2
 Similar to two-part tariffs, our concept of consumer options involves separate option and exercise prices.  
However, unlike in the case of communication service usage which can involve a price for receiving the service as 
well as a charge based on usage (e.g., Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; Lambrecht, et al. 2007), consumer options do not 
involve a lump-sum fee and a per-unit charge. 
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Table 1: The Concept of Consumer Options 
 
  
Consumer Options 
 
 
Real Options 
 
The Option 
 
 
Consumers purchase the right, 
but not the obligation, to make 
a future purchase from the 
firm 
 
 
 
A firm makes an investment to 
preserve the right, but not the 
obligation, to make a future 
investment 
 
Pricing the Option 
 
Option price and exercise 
price are endogenously 
determined by the firm 
 
 
Option price is endogenously 
determined by the firm; 
exercise price is exogenous 
 
 
 
Valuing the Option 
 
 
Heterogeneous consumers 
value the option based on their 
(known) preferences for 
uncertain outcomes; the firm 
values the option based on 
expected consumer demand 
 
 
A  firm values the option 
based on an estimate of what 
its incremental investment 
would trade for in the capital 
markets 
 
Exercising the Option 
 
 
Consumers’ exercise decisions 
are made after the final 
outcome is revealed 
 
The firm’s exercise decision is 
triggered by its estimates of 
market-priced risk 
 
 
To illustrate the concept, consider the following simple, stylized example. Suppose there 
are two (risk neutral) fans in the market, each having the same favorite team.  Let us assume that 
the probability of this favorite team playing in the final championship game is 0.5.  For one fan, 
the value of attending the final game is $200 if her favorite team is playing and $170 if it is not 
(e.g., the event is still “the best party in town”).  For the other fan, the value is $250 if the 
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favorite team makes it to the big game, but she will not attend (i.e., her valuation is $0) if her 
favorite team suffers an early defeat.  It is straightforward to calculate the expected valuations: 
for the first fan it is $185 and for the second fan it is $125. I assume that the fan will purchase the 
ticket if the expected value equals the price. With advance selling, the league will generate 
profits of $250 by selling to both fans at a price of $125. If the league has full information of the 
outcome before it sets prices, it can do better by charging $200 if the favorite team plays in the 
final (so that both fans will buy a ticket) and $170 otherwise—leading to expected profits of 
$285. 
Now, consider pricing with consumer options as shown in Figure 1.  Fans can advance 
purchase a non-refundable option ticket by paying $65 (the option price, oP ) before the 
tournament teams have been announced and then decide later once the matchups are known 
whether they want to attend the final game for an additional $120 (the exercise price, eP ).  In this 
case, the first fan will buy the option and exercise it since her expected valuation is the same as 
the ticket price (profits = $185).  The other fan will buy the option (profit=$65) and exercise it if 
her favorite team is playing.  Thus, there is a 50% chance this fan will also end up buying a ticket 
(yielding another $60 in expected profits). Using consumer options in this manner, the expected 
total profits for the league is $310. In this simple example, the league is able to extract more 
from the first fan with option pricing than with advance selling ($185 instead of $125) and can 
expect to extract the same amount from the other fan ($125) as under advance selling. Thus, 
option pricing can be more profitable than advance selling or even full information pricing. 
10 
 
Figure 1: A Decision Tree for Consumer Options 
T1
0
Exercise the option
for price Pe
Consumer valuation
of the preferred and 
non-preferred outcomes
T0 = outcome is unknown; T1 = outcome is revealed
Po and Pe are set by the firm at T0
•
•Buy the option 
for price  Po
- Po
Do not buy option
Do not exercise option
T0
 
 
 
The extant literature on advance selling assumes that all consumers have positive 
valuations for both the preferred and non-preferred outcomes. However, the existence of fan 
heterogeneity in the example means that some fans are very sensitive to the outcome—their 
valuation for the non-preferred outcome might be zero. In this case, additional profits can be 
earned by offering consumer options. If all fans have positive valuations for both the preferred 
and non-preferred outcomes, the league can always replicate advance selling using option 
pricing. This is done by setting the exercise price to be zero and the option price to be equal to 
the price under advance selling. Therefore, at worst, option pricing can do as well as advance 
selling. Because pricing with consumer options is relatively new, I first consider the profitability 
of consumer options from the firm’s perspective in the next section. To do this, I formulate and 
analyze a stylized model of the league’s ticket pricing decision.   
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Then in the following section, I take the fan’s perspective by empirically exploring fan 
responses to consumer options for NCAA Division I men’s Final Four basketball tickets.  Most 
of the fans in the sample find that consumer options are easy to understand.  Moreover, fans do 
not believe that consumer options are an unfair pricing mechanism, even if they chose to not 
exercise the option ticket.  In agreement with the insights from the analytical model, I find that 
some fans do indeed have zero valuation for a ticket to the championship game without their 
favorite team—suggesting that fans are heterogeneous in their valuations for the (uncertain) 
championship game. I further find that basketball fans are willing to pay more for the flexibility 
that options afford, especially when uncertainty about the teams playing the final game is high.  
Most important, I provide empirical evidence that consumer options can create a win-win 
situation for the league and fans—pricing with consumer options generates more profits for the 
league than their current practice of advance selling, and at the same time, consumer options 
allows positive surplus for fans.   
I conclude by discussing the potential benefits of consumer options to the league given 
their institutional constraints.  I also outline some promising directions for future research. 
 
2.2 MODELS AND ANALYSES 
I first briefly detail the institutional considerations that leagues face in setting prices for 
tournament tickets and discuss why it is important for the leagues to address fans’ concerns.  
Currently most major sports leagues advance sell tickets to the public through a lottery. 
The question that arises is: Given the uncertainty about the teams that will play in the final game, 
why does the league not set ticket prices after the matchups are known? First, given the 
possibility that less popular teams may end up playing, it could just be less risky for leagues to 
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set ticket prices upfront. Competition between popular, powerhouse teams is strongly desired in 
sports markets. For example, demand and prices dropped for the 2006 men’s Final Four when it 
became known that some non-traditional, “Cinderella” teams would be playing (Drew 2006). 
Second, leagues may be subject to “fairness constraints” (Kahneman et al. 1986). Specifically, 
the league could be viewed as an unfair hoarder if it priced and sold tickets right before the 
game. Researchers argue that this is why leagues price tickets before the uncertainty has been 
resolved (Happel and Jennings 1995; Krueger 2001a). Accordingly, in the proposed model, I set 
both the option and the exercise price before the uncertainty is resolved.  
While I believe the concept of consumer options is new to the academic literature, it is 
interesting that some enterprising (third-party) firms have already implemented a version of 
consumer options for sports tickets.  For example, FirstDibz.com (formerly Ticketreserve) sells 
“forward” tickets that are tied to a specific team making it through the tournament—if this team 
loses early, then the forward expires.  Ticket forwards are intriguing because the third-party 
seller would not only earn the exercise price from the fans whose team makes it to the big game, 
but would also collect the initial forward price from every fan thinking their team had a chance 
to make it through the tournament.  My conversations with NCAA league officials, however, 
suggest that they are not interested in offering ticket forwards due to the potential for fan 
backlash (e.g., being seen as profit-hungry organizations that do not really care about the fans). 
On the other hand, my discussions with league representatives indicate that they are open to the 
idea of selling consumer options—tickets that do not expire if a particular team does not make it 
to the final game.  Thus, I hope that this research will help inform the league’s tournament ticket 
pricing decision. 
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Accommodating the sentiments of fans is important because a sizeable fraction of 
leagues’ incomes accrue from other revenue streams, including network broadcasting rights. For 
example, the NCAA’s 11- year contract with CBS Sports (which expires in 2014) brought in $6 
billion - one of the largest contracts in U.S. sports history (Baade and Matheson 2004). Without 
loyal fans, networks would lose viewers, and the leagues could lose bargaining power over the 
stations. Given the critical importance of fan support for both ticket sales and broadcasting 
revenues, upsetting fans is a risk that the leagues are not willing to take. The NFL’s position is 
consistent with this reasoning. Greg Aiello, the league’s vice president for public relations, states 
that the league tries to set a “fair, reasonable price” to maintain an “ongoing relationship with 
fans and business associates” (Krueger 2001b). 
2.2.1  Aggregate Demand Model  
In this section, I formulate and analyze a stylized model of the league’s ticket pricing 
decision. Using this model, I identify the key conditions under which pricing with consumer 
options generates higher profits than advance selling and full information pricing.   
Two models of the league setting the ticket price to a tournament game before the 
uncertainty is resolved are developed – these capture advance selling and option pricing. Further, 
one model of the league setting prices after the uncertainty is resolved is developed – this 
captures the case of full information pricing. For simplicity, I model the situation in which there 
are two possible final outcomes: (1) when a “popular game” occurs and (2) when an “unpopular” 
game occurs. Whereas there are certainly some idiosyncratic team preferences across individual 
fans (e.g., students and alumni are often loyal to their college teams), the reasonable assumption 
that some matchups are more desirable than others is made. For example, Paul and Weinbach 
(2007) find that fans prefer games with a quality matchup between teams with winning records 
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and those that are high-scoring – I refer to games with these traits as popular games. I assume 
that the probability of a popular game occurring isγ . This “consensus” probability is 
exogenously determined and is known to both fans and the league3.  
It is assumed that fans have stable temporal preferences and prefer the popular game over 
the unpopular game. "Team-based" fans are defined as those who have positive utility for the 
game only if it is popular (they have zero utility for an unpopular game). "Game-based" fans, 
however, have positive utility for the game irrespective of whether the matchup is popular or 
unpopular (e.g., even if the game is unpopular, the event is still "the best party in town"). Across 
the pricing mechanisms I model fans’ valuations of the game using a standard vertical 
differentiation model. The valuation of the game for the different fans is represented 
by (0, )i iθ α∈ , where i={G,T} represents game- or team-based fans. Within each segment, a fan 
with a higherθ  values the game more than a fan with a lower θ . Fan valuations are distributed 
uniformly within the interval[0, ]iα ; therefore, ~ [0, ]G Gθ α  and ~ [0, ]T Tθ α  depict the game- 
and team-based fans’ valuations of the game. The net utility of the fan is given by: 
i jU Pθ λ= −       (1) 
where jλ represents the quality of a popular or unpopular game (depending on whether j={1,2}) 
and P is the price paid under a given pricing mechanism. Consistent with the vertical 
differentiation logic (see Shaked and Sutton 1982), I assume that the quality of the popular game 
is higher than that of the unpopular game (i.e., 1 2λ λ> ).  
                                                 
3
 Upon comparing men’s college basketball team rankings from various sources (Associated Press Poll, Coaches 
Poll, ESPN Poll etc) we find that the pre-season rankings for the various teams across many years are very similar. 
We assume that the league and fans can use this readily available information to reach a consensus estimate of the 
probability with which a popular game will occur in a tournament like the Final Four. Our model is robust to some 
error being associated with this consensus estimate across fans – in this case, the consensus estimate represents the 
expected probability.  
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In any ticket pricing problem capacity constraints are an issue. For ease of presentation I 
do not include capacity constraints in our formulation. However, I have verified that the results 
hold when capacity constraints are considered. Details are available in the Appendix. The central 
results remain unchanged when the presence of a resale market is accounted for. I analyze the 
option pricing case first. 
ANALYSIS 
Pricing an option ticket 
Under option pricing, a fan pays the option price ( OP ) before the uncertainty has been resolved 
(time 1, hereafter) and the exercise price ( )GP once the final outcome is known (time 2, 
hereafter). However, the league sets both prices at time 1. In equilibrium, depending on the 
exercise price and the utility for the unpopular game, some game-based fans may attend only the 
popular game (Case A) or all game-based fans could attend either game (Case B). For example, 
if their utility for the unpopular game is low and the exercise price is high, some game-based 
fans may only attend the popular game (if it occurs) and not the unpopular game (if it occurs). 
Therefore, game-based fans may either engage in three behaviors (see Figure 2A) or in two 
behaviors (see Figure 2B). The difference between Figures 2A and 2B is the existence of a group 
of fans who will attend only the popular game. Note that the exercise price is paid only if a fan 
who has purchased the option decides to attend the game at time 2.  
 
Figure 2: Different demand patterns from the game-based fan segment 
                               Figure 2A (Three Behaviors)   Figure 2B (Two Behaviors) 
            
Not buy 
the option 
Buy the option and 
watch either game
1θ Gα0 2θ
Buy the option 
and attend only 
the popular game
      
1θ Gα
Not buy 
the option 
0
Buy the option and 
attend either game
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Figure 3: Demand from the team-based segment 
1θ Tα0
Not buy 
the option 
Buy the option and attend 
only the popular game
 
Across the cases the behavior of the team-based fan stays the same (see Figure 3) - they 
attend only the popular game. This is because, by definition, these fans have no utility for the 
unpopular game. 
The league can decide if it will serve fans from one or both segments through the price 
that it sets. That is, the league can end up serving: (a) only game-based fans, (b) only team-based 
fans, or (c) both fan types. Typically the league will ignore one segment if it is small relative to 
the other segment. I focus on the more interesting case where the segments are of comparable 
size, so that the league serves both segments4. The behaviors in Figure 2A and 2B are considered 
separately as Case A and Case B. 
Case A: Some game-based fans may watch only the popular game (3 behaviors) 
In this case the game-based fans can engage in one of three behaviors (a) buy the option 
and attend either game (BE), (b) buy the option and attend only the popular game (BO) or (c) not 
buy the option (NB). It can be shown that in equilibrium, fans who engage in the BE behavior 
have a higher utility than those who adopt the BO behavior, who have a higher utility than those 
who do not buy the option (NB). Let AGEq represent the demand of game-based fans who attend 
either game, AGOq represent the demand of game-based fans who attend only the popular game. 
                                                 
4
 In addition, when serving one segment the league can always use option pricing to replicate advance selling, by 
setting the exercise price to zero. Therefore, this case is not of theoretical interest. Details are available from the 
authors. 
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The fan with the lowest valuation who adopts the BO behavior is located at 
1
A A
G GE GOq qθ α= − − (see Figure 2A).  From eqn. (1) the utility of the game-based fan who attends 
only the popular game is 1( ) ( )A A A AG GE GO O Gq q P Pγ α λ γ− − − + where AGEq , AGOq  represent the 
demands and 1λ represents the quality of the popular game. The utility of the game-based fan 
who does not buy the option is zero. Equating the utilities from the BO and the NB strategies the 
demand of the game-based fans who attend only the popular game is obtained: 
1( ) ( )A A A AGO G GE O Gq q P Pα γ γλ= − − +     (2) 
I set 1 11 Gλ β= - this implies that the game quality is inversely related to the price sensitivity of the 
fans for that game. This captures the fact that as the game-based fans’ utility ( 1Gθ λ ) increases 
their price sensitivity decreases. Therefore, eqn. (2) can be simplified as: 
1( ) ( )( )A A A AGO G GE G O Gq q P Pα β γ γ= − − +     (3) 
The location of the fan with the lowest valuation for the BE behavior is at 2
A
G GEqθ α= − (see 
Figure 2A). The utility of the fan who attends either game 
is 1 2( ) (1 )( ) ( )A A A AG GE G GE O Gq q P Pγ α λ γ α λ− + − − − + . Equating the utilities of the marginal fan who 
is indifferent between the BE and BO behaviors and substituting 1 1 2 21 and 1 ,G Gλ β λ β= = I 
obtain the demand of fans who attend either game: 
2
A A
GE G G Gq Pα β= −       (4) 
Substituting eqn.(4) into eqn.(3) yields the demand of the game-based fans who attend only the 
popular game: 
2 1( )( )A A A AGO G G G O Gq P P Pβ β γ γ= − +
 
              (5) 
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Next, consider the team-based fans. The team-based fan chooses between (a) buying the 
option and attending the popular game (BO) or (b) not buying the option (NB). It can be shown 
that in equilibrium, fans who engage in the BO behavior have a higher utility than those who 
adopt the NB behavior. The team-based fan with the lowest valuation who adopts the BO 
strategy is located at 1
A
T TOqθ α= − (see Figure 3).  From eqn.(1), the utility of the team-based fan 
who attends only the popular game is 1( ) ( )A A AT TO O Gq P Pγ α λ γ− − + , and the utility of the team-
based fan who does not buy the option is zero. Equating the utilities from the BO and the NB 
behaviors I obtain the demand of the team-based fans who attend only the popular game: 
1( )A A ATO T O Gq P Pα γ γ λ= − +      (6) 
As before, I set 1 11 Tλ β= - this implies that the game quality is inversely related to the price 
sensitivity of the fans for that game. Therefore, the demand is given by: 
1( )( )A A ATO T T O Gq P Pα β γ γ= − +      (7) 
Because the option price is already paid when game-based fans decide whether or not to 
attend the unpopular game, the option price ( AOP ) does not play a role in the demand in eqn. (4). 
However, fans would not purchase the option unless they intend to attend at least the popular 
game. Therefore, the demand of game- and team-based fans who attend only the popular game 
(in eqns. (5) and (7)) is affected by both option and the exercise prices. Profits ( AOBπ ) are denoted 
by: 
( )( ) ( ).A A A A A A A AOB GO TO O G GE O Gq q P P q P Pπ γ= + + + +           (8) 
In eqn. (8) the league obtains both prices ( A AO GP P+ ) from the game-based fans who attend either 
game ( )AGEq whereas it obtains the exercise price with a certain probability (γ ) from game- and 
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team-based fans who attend only the popular game ( ,A AGO TOq q ). The league chooses the optimal 
option and exercise prices after substituting the demands from eqns.(4), (5) and (7) into the profit 
function in eqn. (8). Differentiating this profit expression with respect to AOP and AGP , equating 
those differentials to zero, and solving the resulting first order conditions yields the optimal 
outcomes in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Optimal prices, quantities, and profits under option pricing – Case A 
Prices Quantities Profits 
1 1 2
( )( )
2( ) 2
A T G G
O
G T G
P α α αγ
β β β
+
= −
+
22
A G
G
G
P α
β
=  
2
A G
GEq
α
= , 1 1
1 12( )
A G T T G
GO
G T
q α β α β
β β
−
=
+
 
1 1 1
1 1
(2 )
2( )
A T G T G T
TO
G T
q α β β α β
β β
+ −
=
+
 
2 2
1 1 2
( ) (1 )
4( ) 4
A G T G
OB
G T G
α α α
π γ γ
β β β
+
= + −
+
 
 
Note that as fans’ utilities increase, their price sensitivities decrease. As an example, an 
increase in the overall utility of the game-based segment for the popular game can be associated 
with an increase in Gα  or a decrease in 1Gβ . This interpretation is used to explain the intuitions 
for the optimal prices5.  
Note that the price of the option ( )AOP  increases with respect to 2Gβ
 
in Table 2: 
 0AOP >  if 2 1G G T Tβ α β α>                  (9) 
Intuitively, as the utility for the unpopular game decreases (i.e., as 2Gβ
 
increases), the value of 
the option increases. Conversely, as the utility of the unpopular game increases (i.e., as 2Gβ
 
decreases), the exercise price ( AGP ) increases. 
                                                 
5
 This is consistent with the individual utility model. For example, as game-based fans’ valuations for the popular 
game 1( )θλ  increase, their price sensitivities 1( )Gβ decrease because 1 11 Gλ β= .  
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Some game-based fans attend only the popular game when the utility of the game-based 
segment for the popular game is sufficiently high (i.e., when 1Gβ  is low): 
 
0AGOq >  if 1 1G G T Tβ α β α<                  (10) 
To the right of the threshold in eqn. (10), as the game-based fan’s valuation increases, all game-
based fans who buy the option attend either game (i.e., the number of fans who attend just one 
game, ,AGOq equals zero). Therefore, Case A no longer applies. Profits in Case B where all game-
based fans who purchase the option attend either game (i.e., the case when 1 1G G T Tβ α β α> ) are 
computed next. 
Case B: All game-based fans watch either game (2 Behaviors) 
I begin Case B by deriving the demand from the game- and team-based fans. Here, the game-
based fans can engage in either BE or NB (the corresponding utility is zero). The fan with the 
lowest (positive) valuation for the BE behavior is located at 1 BG GEqθ α= − . The utility of a fan 
who adopts BE is
 
1 2( ) (1 )( ) ( )B B B BG GE G GE O Gq q P Pγ α λ γ α λ− + − − − + . Equating the utilities from the 
BE and NB behaviors, the demand from fans who watch either game is: 
1 2 2 1( ( )) ( (1 ) )B B BGE G G G O G G Gq P Pα β β γ β γ β= − + + −        ( 11) 
The team-based segment’s behavior does not change between Cases A and B. Therefore, the 
demand from the team-based segment is derived exactly as in Case A (eqn.(6)): 
1( )( )B B BTO T T O Gq P Pα β γ γ= − +           ( 12) 
The demand functions are denoted by eqns. ( 11) and ( 12). Profits are denoted by:  
( ) ( ).B B B B B B BOB GE O G TO O Gq P P q P Pπ γ= + + +     ( 13) 
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Note that all game-based fans who purchase the option end up exercising the option by paying 
 to watch either the popular game or the unpopular game. Maximizing these profits with 
respect to  and  (and straightforward substitution of the derived optimal prices) yields the  
optimal outcomes in Table 3. 
Table 3: Optimal prices, quantities, and profits under option pricing – Case B 
Prices Quantities Profits 
1 1
1 1 2
( )
2 (1 ) 2
B T G G T G
O
T G G
P α β α β γ αγ
β β γ β
−
= −
−
 
1 1
2 1 1
( )
2 2 (1 )
B G T G G T
G
G T G
P α γ α β α β
β β β γ
−
= −
−
 
2
B G
GEq
α
=  
2
B T
TOq
α
=  
 
2 2
1 2 1 1 2
2 1 1
( (1 ) )
4
B T G G G T G G
OB
G G T
α β β γ α β β γ β γ
π
β β β
+ − +
=
 
 
Note that: 
 
0BOP >  if 2 1G G T Tβ α β α>                  (14) 
 
0BGP >  if 2 1 1 1 1(1 ) ( )G G G T T G G Tβ α β β γ α β α β γ< − −                 (15) 
That is, for the optimal option and exercise price to be positive, should lie within certain 
bounds (i.e., 1 2 1 1 1 1(1 ) ( )G T T G G G T T G G Tα β α β α β β γ α β α β γ< < − − ). The left bound in the 
expression 1 2( )G T T Gα β α β<
 
indicates the condition required for the option price ( )BOP to be 
positive. Similar to the intuition in Case A as the utility for the unpopular game decreases, the 
value of the option increases. The right bound 2 1 1 1 1( (1 ) ( ) )G G G T T G G Tβ α β β γ α β α β γ< − −
 
indicates the condition needed for the exercise price ( )BGP to be positive. Together, the bounds 
indicate that game-based fans should have a minimum value for the unpopular game so that the 
optimal exercise price is positive and a maximum value for the unpopular game so that the 
optimal option price is positive.  
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When the probability of the popular game occurring is low (i.e., if 1 2γ < ) the value of 
the option is high and the game-based fans’ utility for the unpopular game can lie within the 
required bounds (i.e., when 1 2γ <  the right bound is greater than the left bound). However, 
if 1 2γ > , the value of the option is low and a higher utility for the popular game is required to 
ensure that the right bound is greater than the left bound:  
1 1 (2 1)G G T Tβ α β γ α γ< −                (16) 
I compare the optimal prices and profits across option Cases A and B. The exercise price 
in Case A is lower than that in Case B (i.e., B AG GP P< ). Intuitively, the lower exercise price 
ensures that game-based fans who buy the option attend either game in Case B. However, this 
also means they are willing to pay a lower price for the option. Consistent with this intuition, the 
option price in Case B is higher than in Case A ( B AO OP P> ). Further, it can be seen that profits are 
higher in Case B ( BOBπ > ).AOBπ  The intuition for this is as follows. In Case A, much like the team-
based fans, some game-based fans attend only the popular game. Setting prices at levels which 
ensure that team-based fans purchase the option implies leaving game-based fans with 
considerable surplus. In Case B, because the behaviors of the two segments are different (i.e., all 
team-based fans attend only the popular game, all game-based fans attend either game) more 
surplus can be extracted from both groups, leading to higher profits in Case B than in Case A. 
Depending on the fans’ valuations the league sets the prices, which in turn, determines whether 
some game-based fans watch only the popular game (Case A applies) or if all watch either game 
(Case B applies). 
 
Advance selling 
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Advance selling refers to the conventional approach – here the league sets the price at the 
beginning of the season before the uncertainty has been resolved (time 1). Fans purchase tickets 
based on forward-looking expected utility. The advance ticket price is in the nature of a sunk 
cost that is paid up front. Because game-based fans obtain positive utility from attending either 
game at time 2 without making any additional payments they attend either the popular or 
unpopular game - whichever event happens. Therefore, the game-based fans will (a) attend either 
game (BE) or (b) not buy the ticket (NB). Equating the expected utility of the game-based fan 
from buying the ticket under advance pricing (i.e., under BE) to zero (the utility under NB), the 
demand of the game-based fans who attend either game is: 
1 2 2 1( ) ( (1 ) )G G G G G Gq Pα β β γβ γ β= − + −     ( 17) 
The team-based fans obtain zero utility from attending the unpopular game. Therefore, they will 
watch only the popular game if it occurs (BO), or not buy the ticket (NB). Equating the utilities 
from the BO and the NB behaviors, I obtain the demand of the team-based fans who attend only 
the popular game: 
1( )T T Tq Pα β γ= −        ( 18) 
Here, P represents the advance selling price, Gq is the quantity demanded by the game-based 
segment and Tq is the quantity demanded by the team-based segment. The profit function ( ABπ ) 
is given by: 
( )AB G TP q qπ = +      (19) 
Substituting the demands from eqns. ( 17) and ( 18) into eqn. (19) yields the profit expression. 
Differentiating this profit expression with respect to P, equating that differential to zero, and 
solving the resulting first order condition yields the optimal outcomes in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Optimal price, quantities, and profits under advance selling 
 
Given these profits, which pricing mechanism should the league implement? Proposition 
1 provides the answer: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Profits under option pricing are always greater than or equal to those under 
advance selling. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
I first compare profits under option pricing Case A with those under advance selling: 
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
(1 )( ( ( ) ( ( 2 )) ) (2 ))
( )( ( (1 ) ))
A G T G G T G T G G T G T G G G T
OB AB
G G T G T G T G
γ α β β β β β β β β β β γ γα β β α α
π π
β β β β β γ β β γ β γ
− + − − + − − +
− =
+ + − +
 
( 20) 
The denominator is positive. To prove the proposition, I therefore need to show that the 
numerator is positive as well. I rewrite the numerator as: 
2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1(1 )( (1 )( ) ( )( (2 ))G G T G T G T G G T T G G G Tγ α β β γ β β β α β α β α β α β β γ− − + − − + +           ( 21) 
It is easy to see that eqn. ( 21) is positive when 1 1G G T Tβ α β α< . From eqn. (10) this is the 
condition that ensures 0.AGOq > Therefore, in the parametric region relevant to the analysis, profits 
under option pricing Case A exceed those from advance selling.  
Next, I compare profits under option pricing Case B with those under advance selling: 
Price Quantities Profits 
1 2
1 2 1 1 2
( )((1 ) )
2( ( (1 ) ))
G T G G
T G G T G
γ α α γ β γβ
β β γ β β γ β γ
++ −
+ − +
 
1 1
1 2 2 1 1
1 2 1 1 2
2
((( ) 2 ( ) )
2( ( (1 ) ))
G T G
T G G G G G G T
G
T G G T G
q
α β β
γ α α β β α β β β
β β γ β β γ β γ
 
 − − − − =
+ − +
1 1 2
1 2 1 1 2
( ) ((1 ) )
2( ( (1 ) ))
G T T G G
T T
T G G T G
q α α β γ β β γα
β β γ β β γ β γ
−
+ − +
=
+ − +
 
2
1 2
1 2 1 1 2
( ) ( (1 ) )
4( ( (1 ) ))
G T G G
AB
T G G T G
γ α α β γ β γ
π
β β γ β β γ β γ
+ − +
=
+ − +
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2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2( ( (1 ) )) 4 ( ( (1 ) ))BOB AB T G G G T G G G G T G T G T Gπ π α β β γ α β β γ β γ β β β β β γ β β γ β γ− = + − + + − +
 
( 22) 
Note that eqn. ( 22) is always positive. Therefore, profits under option pricing Case B exceed 
those from advance selling. 
The intuition for proposition 1 is simple. Prices under both option and advance selling are 
set early in the season. The league can always use option pricing to mimic advance selling by 
setting the option price equal to the price under advance selling, and the exercise price equal to 
zero. Therefore, option pricing can do no worse than advance selling. 
A more detailed picture can be obtained by comparing the differences in the way that 
option pricing and advance selling extract surplus from fans. Across the pricing mechanisms, the 
expected utility of the game-based fans are higher, on average, than that of the team-based fans. 
When the expected utility of the game-based fans is higher, the price under advance selling is set 
low enough so that a sufficient number of team-based fans are captured. In that process, game-
based fans are left with substantial surplus. Under option pricing, in contrast, the league extracts 
more surplus from the team-based segment by increasing the option price and reducing the 
exercise price. The reduction in exercise price ensures the game-based fans who buy the option 
are willing to watch whichever game occurs. Further, the high option price can be used to extract 
the surplus of more game-based fans as well. Therefore, by effectively balancing the option and 
exercise prices, option pricing succeeds in extracting greater surplus from the fans compared to 
advance selling and consequently yields the higher profits.  
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Proposition 1 is depicted graphically using Figure 46. The x-axis represents the price 
sensitivity of game-based fans for the popular game ( 1Gβ ). As we move along the x-axis (as the 
price sensitivity increases) the utility of game-based fans for the popular game decreases. 
Therefore as we move along the x-axis the relative preference of the team-based fan over that of 
the game-based fan increases. The y-axis represents the price sensitivity ( 2Gβ ) of the game-
based fans for the unpopular game. Similar to the intuition in the x-axis, as we move along the y-
axis the utility for the unpopular game decreases. Therefore, the y-axis can be seen as indicating 
the preference of the game-based fan for the unpopular game. Consistent with the assumption in 
the vertical differentiation model the quality of the popular game is higher than that of the 
unpopular game (or 2 1G Gβ β> ). Consequently the region where 2 1G Gβ β< is ignored because in 
this region the quality of the unpopular game is higher than that of the popular game.  
I begin by explaining the thresholds on the two axes. On the x-axis, to the left of 
threshold a, the league serves only the game-based fans under option pricing. To the right of 
Curve A, where the expected utility of the game-based segment is sufficiently low, the league 
serves only the team-based fans. The striped region indicates the area where both segments are 
served under option pricing and advance selling. As stated earlier, our interest lies in the striped 
region. Threshold b is defined as the ‘main condition’ – to the left of b the relative utility of the 
game-based segment over the team-based segment is sufficiently high, therefore some game-
based fans watch just the popular game (Case A applies). To the right of b all the game-based 
fans who buy the option watch either game (Case B applies). The threshold on the y-axis 
                                                 
6
 For expository convenience, we set Gα = 5, Tα = 6, 1Tβ = 1 and γ = 0.7 for drawing the curves in the figures that 
follow. However, we characterize all the results in analytical terms. 
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corresponding to 2 1G G T Tβ α β α>
 
indicates the level above which the option prices ( ,A BO OP P ) are 
positive. 
 
Figure 4: Optimal league strategy under option pricing and advance selling 
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Because profits under option pricing exceed those from advance selling (from 
Proposition 1) the league should implement option pricing in the striped region. As discussed in 
Case B when the probability of the popular game occurring is high ( 1 2)γ > threshold c ensures 
that the utility for the unpopular game is within the bounds that ensures positive option and 
exercise prices. To the right of threshold c option pricing can be used to replicate advance selling 
(by setting the option price equal to the price under advance selling and the exercise price at 
zero). When the probability of the popular game occurring is low ( 1 2)γ <
 
the value of the option 
is high and threshold c does not exist - Case B extends to the right. This implies profits under 
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option pricing exceed those from advance selling over a larger region when 1 2γ < . Intuitively, 
the role of the option in protecting the fans from uncertainty becomes more salient as the 
likelihood of the popular game occurring decreases. 
In summary, profits under option pricing always equal or exceed those from advance 
selling. With both option pricing and advance selling the league sets prices before the uncertainty 
is resolved. Therefore, it is intuitive that option pricing can be made to mimic advance selling. 
However, with full information pricing the league prices tickets after the uncertainty is resolved. 
Therefore, it is unclear how profits under option pricing will compare with those under full 
information pricing. The full information pricing mechanism is discussed next. 
 
Full information pricing 
With full information pricing, the league can set different prices 1(P or 2 )P  depending on 
whether the popular or unpopular game occurs7. Note that when the unpopular game occurs the 
league will always serve only the game-based fans because this is the only segment with positive 
valuation in that state. I derive the demand of the game-based fans first. Consider the case where 
the popular game occurs. The utility of the game-based fan who attends this game is 
1 1 1( )G Gq Pα λ− − and the utility from not attending the game is zero. Equating these utilities, the 
demand of game-based fans for the popular game is: 
1 1 1G G Gq Pα β= −      ( 23) 
If the unpopular game occurs, the utility of the fan from attending this game is 2 2 2( )G Gq Pα λ− −  
and the utility from not attending is zero. Equating these utilities, the demand of game-based fans 
is: 
                                                 
7
 As discussed earlier, full information pricing is challenging for the leagues to implement.  
29 
 
2 2 2G G Gq Pα β= −      ( 24) 
Next, I derive the demand of the team-based fans. Consider the case where the popular game 
occurs (team-based fans will not see the unpopular game). The utility of the team-based fan 
attending the popular game is 1 1 1( )T Tq Pα λ− − and the utility of not attending the game is zero. 
Equating these utilities, the demand of team-based fans for the popular game is: 
1 1 1T T Tq Pα β= −      ( 25) 
The demand of the game- and team-based segments (from eqns. ( 23) and ( 25)) are denoted by: 
1 1 1G G Gq Pα β= − ;         1 1 1T T Tq Pα β= −            ( 26) 
Expected profits ( FBπ ) are: 
1 1 1 2 2( ) (1 ) .FB T G GP q q P qπ γ γ= + + −         (27) 
Substituting the demands from eqn. ( 25) and ( 26) into eqn. (27) yields the optimal expected 
profits. Differentiating this profit expression with respect to 1P and 2 ,P equating those differentials 
to zero, and solving the resulting first order conditions yields the optimal outcomes in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Optimal prices, quantities, and profits under full information pricing 
 
The comparison of profits under option pricing in Cases A and B with full information 
profits are summarized in the propositions below: 
 
Prices Quantities Profits 
1
1 1
( )
2( )
G T
G T
P α α
β β
+
=
+
 
2
22
G
G
P α
β
=  
1 1 1 1(( ) 2( ))G G G T G G Tq α α α β β β= − + +
1 1 1 1(( ) 2( ))T T G T T G Tq α α α β β β= − + +
2 2
G
Gq
α
=  
2 2
1 1 2
( ) (1 )
4( ) 4
G T G
FB
G T G
γ α α γ α
π
β β β
+ −
= +
+
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PROPOSITION 2: Profits under option pricing when some game-based fans may watch only the 
popular game (Case A) equal expected profits under full information pricing.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Comparing the profitability equations from above, it is straightforward to show that these profits 
are equal.  
The intuition for proposition 2 is as follows. When the average utility of the game-based 
fan for the unpopular game is high (i.e., when 2Gβ
 
is low) the value of the option is low because 
fans do not need a strong protection against the downside. For the option price to be positive the 
utility for the unpopular game should be low (from eqns. (9) and (14)). In this region because the 
average utility of the game-based fan for the unpopular game is low (i.e., 2Gβ
 
is high) fans gain 
more by protecting themselves from the downside. Consequently, the value of the option is high 
and profits under option pricing equal expected profits under full information pricing.  
 
PROPOSITION 3: Profits under option pricing when all game-based fans watch either game 
(Case B) exceed expected profits under full information pricing. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
I compare profits under option pricing (Case B) with expected profits under full information 
pricing: 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) 4 ( )BOB FB T G G T G T G Tπ π α β α β γ β β β β− = − +              ( 28) 
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Note that eqn. ( 28) is always positive. Therefore, profits under option pricing in Case B 
(corresponding to the parametric region to the right of the main condition in Figure 4) exceed 
expected profits under full information pricing. 
The intuition for proposition 3 is as follows. Under Case B, the game-based fans have a 
lower utility for the popular game.  At the same time, under Case B, game-based fans have a 
higher expected utility than the team-based fans (see eqn.(15)). Under full information pricing, 
when serving both segments and the popular game occurs, the price will be set low to capture a 
sufficient number of game-based fans who have a lower utility for that game on average than 
team-based fans. Therefore, team-based fans are left with substantial surplus. As discussed 
earlier, under option pricing, the league extracts more surplus from the team-based segment by 
increasing the option price and reducing the exercise price. By effectively balancing between the 
option and exercise price, option pricing succeeds in extracting surplus from more of the game-
based and team-based fans compared to full information pricing. Note that in this case, the 
league can potentially obtain higher profits by setting the option and exercise prices before 
uncertainty has been revealed, compared to profits obtained if it set prices after uncertainty was 
revealed.  This result has implications for other markets where it may not be possible to 
implement full information pricing due to fairness constraints or other restrictions. 
  To complete the analysis, I compare profits under full information with those from 
advance selling. The results are summarized in the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 4a: To the left of the main condition (threshold b in Figure 4), expected profits 
under full information pricing always exceed those under advance selling. 
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Proof of Proposition 4a 
I compare profits from full information and advance selling. The difference between the profits 
is given by: 
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
(1 )( ( ( ) ( ( 2 )) ) (2 ))
( )( ( (1 ) ))
G T G G T G T G G T G T G G G T
FB AB
G G T G T G T G
γ α β β β β β β β β β β γ γα β β α α
π π
β β β β β γ β β γ β γ
− + − − + − − +
− =
+ + − +
  
( 29) 
The denominator is positive. To prove the proposition, I therefore need to show that the 
numerator is positive as well. I rewrite the numerator as: 
2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1(1 )( (1 )( ) ( )( (2 ))G G T G T G T G G T T G G G Tγ α β β γ β β β α β α β α β α β β γ− − + − − + +           ( 30) 
It is easy to see that eqn. ( 30) is positive when 1 1G G T Tβ α β α< . From eqn. (10) this is the 
condition that ensures 0.AGOq > Therefore, to the left of the ‘main condition’ (when 
1 1G G T Tβ α β α< ), expected profits under full information exceed those from advance selling.  
The intuition is as follows: to the left of threshold b the average utility of the game-based 
segment for the popular game is higher than that of the team-based segment (from eqn.(10)). 
Further, the game-based segment can derive additional utility from watching the unpopular 
game. Consequently, the average expected utility of the team-based segment is low compared to 
the game-based segment. This low level of expected utility for the team-based segment drags 
down the advance selling price, thereby doing a poor job of surplus extraction across the 
segments and leaving the game-based fans with a substantial surplus. In contrast, the full 
information pricing mechanism collects profits separately from the states of nature where the 
popular or unpopular games occur. Therefore, it can capture additional surplus from the game-
based segment in case the unpopular game occurs. Further, in the event that the popular game 
occurs, the gap between the average utilities across the segments is narrower, and the 
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corresponding full information price can do a better job of extracting surplus across the 
segments. 
 
PROPOSITION 4b: To the right of the main condition (threshold b in Figure 4), expected 
profits under full information pricing exceed those under advance selling only when the average 
utility of the game-based fans for the unpopular game is high. 
Proof of Proposition 4b 
The difference between full information and advance selling profits is: 
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
(1 )( ( ( ) ( ( 2 )) ) (2 ))
( )( ( (1 ) ))
G T G G T G T G G T G T G G G T
FB AB
G G T G T G T G
γ α β β β β β β β β β β γ γα β β α α
π π
β β β β β γ β β γ β γ
− + − − + − − +
− =
+ + − +
( 31) 
The denominator is always positive. To the right of the main condition, the numerator is negative 
and profits under full information exceed those under advance selling if: 
2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 )( ) ( )(2 )G G G T G T T G G T G G T G G Tβ α β β γ β β α β α β α β α β α β γ< − + − + +     ( 32) 
Stated differently, profits under advance selling exceed those under full information pricing 
when  is sufficiently high, i.e., when the utility of the game-based fans for the unpopular 
game is relatively low. 
The intuition is as follows. Pricing under full information separately extracts surplus from 
the game-based fans when the unpopular game occurs – therefore, it can extract this surplus 
efficiently. To the extent that the utility of the game-based fans associated with the unpopular 
game is higher, the advantage of full information pricing over advance pricing increases. In 
contrast, if the average utility for the unpopular game is low (i.e., 2Gβ
 
is high), the power of full 
information pricing to separately extract profits in the case of the unpopular game is less 
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important. Therefore, expected profits under full information exceed profits under advance 
selling when the utility for the unpopular game is high8. 
 
Optimal league pricing strategies 
I summarize the discussion using Figure 5. I focus on the regions where both segments are 
served and the option and exercise prices are positive. This is indicated by regions S1 and S2 in 
Figure 5.  
As in Figure 4 the x-axis represents the price sensitivity of game-based fans for the 
popular game ( 1Gβ ) and the y-axis represents the price sensitivity of the game-based fan segment 
( 2Gβ ) for the unpopular game. As a reminder, the ‘main condition’ differentiates between when 
some game-based fans may watch only the popular game (Case A) versus when all game-based 
fans watch either game (Case B). To the left of the threshold ( 1 (2 1)G T Tα β γ α γ − )  on the x-axis, 
the utility for the unpopular game is such that option and exercise prices can be positive in Case 
B. Threshold i indicates the threshold above which the option prices ( ,A BO OP P )  are positive. 
In region S1 profits under option pricing equal expected full information profits 
(Proposition 2 applies). It has been shown earlier that profits under option pricing exceed those 
under advance selling in this region. Therefore, in S1 the league should implement either option 
pricing or full information pricing. In the presence of fairness constraints, option pricing is the 
more viable alternative.  
In region S2, option pricing is more profitable than full information pricing (Proposition 3 
applies). It has already been shown that profits under option pricing Case B exceed those from 
advance selling. Therefore profits under option pricing Case B exceed profits under advance 
                                                 
8
 Xie and Shugan (2001) have demonstrated that, under some conditions, advance selling can be more profitable 
than pricing closer to the event. Our results confirm this finding.  
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selling and full information pricing in this region. As discussed earlier, the region where 
profitability of options exceeds those from other pricing mechanisms (S2) extends to the right 
when probability of the popular game occurring is low (or if 1 2γ < ). Profitability from options 
can be further enhanced if the league resells the unexercised options once the uncertainty has 
been revealed9.  
 
Figure 5: Optimal league strategies across pricing mechanisms  
Main Condition
S1
Preference of GB fan for 
unpopular game
The league can use either 
Full Information or 
Option Pricing (Case A) 
in this region. 
The league should use 
Option Pricing. Option 
profits (Case B)  
exceeds profits from 
other pricing 
mechanisms 
S2
We ignore this region
1( )Gβ
2( )Gβ
1 0Gβ =
2 0Gβ =
2 1G Gβ β<
1
.
G T
T
a
α β
α
1
. (2 1)
G T
T
b α β γ
α γ −
1
.
G T
T
i α β
α
Option pricing 
replicates advance 
selling.
Option pricing 
replicates advance 
selling.
Preference of GB fan 
for popular  game
 
 
In order to clarify the intuitions underlying the profitability of option pricing, I next 
consider a simple model involving two fans, each having different valuations for attending the 
                                                 
9
 Xie and Gerstner (2003) suggest that stadiums with fixed capacity can profit by making the cancellation process 
easier for fans so that leagues can resell the limited seats. In our case, if fans do not exercise the option by a given 
cut-off date the league could resell the unexercised options as discounted regular tickets. The league would collect 
an option price from those who did not exercise their options and could resell the ticket at a discount, further 
disadvantaging scalpers.  
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uncertain championship game. This individual level model allows us to identify the conditions 
under which pricing with consumer options can indeed generate higher profits for the league than 
advance selling or pricing with full information.  Importantly, I demonstrate that fan 
heterogeneity (i.e., one fan has zero valuation for the non-preferred outcome) is a necessary 
condition for consumer options to be valuable to consumers and firms. 
 
2.2.2  Individual Level Model  
Similar to the assumptions in the aggregate demand model I assume tickets (options) are only 
sold at the beginning of the season before the final teams are known (tickets are unavailable at 
the end of the season when there is no uncertainty in the final matchup).  I assume that the 
favorite team is common across fans and both fans prefer a game in which the favorite team is 
playing (the preferred game) to one in which it is not (the non-preferred game). However, one 
fan is assumed to be very sensitive to who is playing and thus is much less interested in attending 
the final game than the other fan if the favorite team is not playing.  I label the first a team-based 
fan and the second a game-based fan. I assume that the team-based fan is willing to pay  for a 
game involving the favorite team and  otherwise ( ); whereas the game-based fan is 
willing to pay GU
+
 for the preferred game and GU
−
 for the non-preferred game ( ). Fans 
are assumed to be risk neutral and thus will make their ticket purchase decisions by maximizing 
their expected utility10. I further assume the probability of the preferred game occurring (γ) is 
exogenous and known to both the fans and the league11.  Given this notation, the team-based 
                                                 
10
 We note that this is a conservative approach for examining the profitability of consumer options.  If fans are risk 
averse, their valuation of a option ticket would only be greater than that discussed in this section. 
 
11
 Experts often provide these estimates early in the season. In comparing men’s college basketball team rankings 
from various expert sources (Associated Press Poll, Coaches Poll, ESPN Poll, etc.), we find that the preseason 
rankings for the various teams across many years are very similar. This is because most experts use the same 
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fan’s expected valuation for the game is  and the game-based fan’s 
expected valuation is .  Finally, I assume there are no additional fixed 
or variable costs associated with implementing consumer options. 
 In the remainder of this section, I focus on the situation in which the league sets ticket 
prices so that both fans participate. In this general situation, there is a price at which each fan 
will purchase a ticket and attend the championship game irrespective of the teams.   To decide on 
ticket prices, the league must consider the relative sizes of the fans’ expected valuations.  The 
league will set prices to equal the lower valuation to ensure that both fans participate: (1) if 
, then the league sets price equal to  and (2) if , then the league sets 
price equal to .  In either case, the optimal advance selling price is equal to the optimal 
consumer options price ( ), and consequently, profits are the same ( ).  In 
this general situation, consumer options offer no additional benefits over the current practice of 
advance selling. 
 However, suppose the team-based fan is so sensitive to the teams in the final game that 
their willingness to pay for the non-preferred game is zero (i.e., ).  In this case, the league 
cannot ensure that the team-based fan will attend the final game—here, the team-based fan will 
only exercise the option if the preferred game occurs.  Unlike the more general situation above, 
consumer options now offers the team-based fan a valuable way to manage the risk associated 
with the final game.  Moreover, if  the league can obtain higher profits from 
consumer options than advance selling12.   
                                                                                                                                                             
information, namely the team’s performance in the previous season, to estimate their performance in the next 
season. Because both the league and fans have the same information, we assume they have the same prior beliefs.  
 
12
 If , then the league will set price equal to  to ensure that the game-based fan will purchase a ticket.  
Once again, the advance selling price is equal to the consumer options price and profits are equivalent.   
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 There are two cases to examine13: (1)  and (2) .  
In the first case, the league sets the consumer options price so that the individual rationality of 
the team-based fan is satisfied: .  To ensure that the game-based fan exercises 
the option, the league sets the exercise price equal to the game-based fan’s willingness to pay for 
the non-preferred game: .  Using these together to solve for the optimal option price 
gives .  Here, the game-based fan will purchase the option and exercise it, 
while the team-based fan will purchase the option and only exercise it if the preferred game 
occurs.  Expected league profits are: 
  ( 33) 
 When , the league sets the consumer options price equal to the 
expected valuation of each fan:  and .  
Simultaneously solving these two equations yields optimal option and exercise prices: 
 and .  Note that as the utility 
for the non-preferred game increases, the price of the option decreases. This is intuitive because 
as the utility for the non-preferred game increases the value of protecting against the downside 
decreases. Therefore the value of the option, and consequently the price of the option, reduces. In 
this case, expected league profits are: 
    ( 34) 
 The profits from consumer options in ( 33) and ( 34) can be compared with profits from 
advance selling.  When , the league implements an advance selling strategy by setting 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
13
 If  , the league follows an advanced selling strategy. 
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the optimal price equal to the team-based fan’s expected valuation ( ), generating 
profits of  
        ( 35) 
Keeping in mind that  in this case, I find that expected profits from 
consumer options are always greater than profits from advance selling. 
 The analytical results to this point can be condensed into two conditions necessary for 
profits from consumer options to be higher than profits from advance selling. 
 
 Condition 1:  Fan valuations for the game are heterogeneous.  Specifically, team-based  
   fans have zero valuation for the non-preferred game. 
 
 Condition 2:  The game-based fan’s expected valuation for the game is higher than the  
   team-based fan’s expected valuation. 
 
 Further, I compare these profits to those from full information pricing14. When 
, the league can implement full information pricing as follows15. If the 
preferred game occurs, the league sets price equal to the game-based fan’s willingness to pay for 
the preferred game and if the non-preferred game occurs, it sets price equal to the game-based 
fan’s willingness to pay for the non-preferred game.  In this case, expected league profits are 
     ( 36) 
                                                 
14
 The comparison of profits with full information pricing is done more for theoretical interest; as stated earlier, due 
to fairness constraints,  the league would not set ticket prices after knowing which teams were playing in a final 
game.  
 
15
 If , the league sets price equal to the team-based fan’s willingness to pay for the preferred 
game if the preferred game occurs. If the non-preferred game occurs, it sets price equal to the game-based fan’s 
willingness to pay for the non-preferred game.  In this case, profits from full information pricing equal profits from 
consumer options in (1). 
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Comparing ( 34), ( 35) and ( 36), I find that profits from consumer options will be higher than 
profits from advance selling and full information pricing if the team-based fan’s willingness to 
pay for the preferred game is higher than the game-based fan’s willingness to pay for the 
preferred game. 
 The analytical findings indicate that consumer options can indeed generate more profits 
for the league than the current practice of advance selling.  The conditions under which expected 
profits from consumer options dominate profits from advance selling are summarized in 
Conditions 1 and 2. Intuitively, as the game-based fan's gap in utility between the preferred and 
the non-preferred outcomes increases the value of the option increases. Further, as the 
profitability of the favorite team making it to the final decreases the profit gap between option 
pricing and advance selling increases. This speaks to the value of option pricing in uncertain 
environments. The league can always mimic advance selling profits using option pricing by 
setting the exercise price equal to zero. Therefore advance selling is a special case of option 
pricing. Option pricing enables higher profits through: (a) better price discrimination and (b) 
leveraging uncertainty. 
In the next section, I empirically demonstrate the face validity of these analytical 
conditions and that expected profits from consumer options (based on stated willingness to pay) 
are higher than other pricing arrangements. 
 
2.3 AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
In this section, I empirically explore fans’ willingness to pay (WTP) for different types of 
tickets to the NCAA Final Four men’s basketball championship game under various level of 
uncertainty in the team matchups.  I use Final Four tickets as the stimulus because of its 
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relevance to the student population (94% of the respondents were familiar with the Final Four 
tournament). To elicit more accurate WTP measures, I offered fans the opportunity to enter a 
drawing to buy a real ticket to a Final Four championship game based on their stated WTP for a 
ticket16. 
2.3.1  Data and Measures 
 One hundred and fifty-five undergraduate students from a large university were recruited 
to participate in a 20-minute within-subject computer study in return for $5 cash17. At the 
beginning of the study, these respondents were asked to indicate their favorite men’s college 
basketball team (over 90% of respondents listed the home university as their favorite team).  
Subsequent questions were then automatically adjusted so that they were pertinent to that 
particular team. To be eligible for inclusion in the study, respondents had to answer a set of 
questions designed to test their understanding of the options concept; four students were dropped 
from the sample because they did not pass this screen, resulting in a final sample size of one 
hundred and fifty-one fans. 
Fans indicated their WTP for tickets to the final game for three different pricing 
conditions: (1) advance selling, (2) consumer options, and (3) full information pricing. Across 
the pricing conditions, I offered fans the same broad range of prices ($0 to $400, in increments of 
$20). In the advance selling condition, fans indicated their WTP for a “regular ticket” given three 
uncertainty levels (i.e., probability of the favorite team making it to the final game; γ=0.25, 0.50, 
                                                 
16
 Of the fans in our study, 63% volunteered to participate in the drawing.  Participants were informed that if their 
name was drawn, they would be required to buy the ticket by paying the average price they had indicated in our 
study.  The winner of the drawing paid $200 for an upper-level ticket to the 2007 Championship game at the RCA 
Dome in Indianapolis. 
  
17
 We use a within-subject design because the consumer options concept is new.  To help ensure that this concept 
was understood, fans had to think about the option ticket as well as the more familiar regular ticket. Pretests further 
indicated that fans were not overwhelmed with the three pricing conditions because their responses simply involved 
clicking on their preferred dollar amount.  
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and 0.75) of their favorite team making it through the tournament. Based on extensive pre-
testing, in the consumer options condition I fixed the levels of the option price ( oP ) for these 
three probabilities at $20, $40 and $60, respectively18. Given a certain option price, fans 
indicated the exercise price they were willing to pay (
∧
eP ) at the three different uncertainty levels 
(thus, expected WTP for the option ticket is )
∧
+ eo PP γ
19
. In the full information condition, fans 
indicated their WTP for a “regular” ticket after they were told whether or not their favorite team 
actually made it to the final game.  Importantly, fans had the choice of not buying a ticket under 
all pricing conditions—they could simply indicate a WTP of $0.  
Because this is a within-subject design, the presentation order of tickets was counter-
balanced to control for possible order effects20. To control for differences in payment timing 
across the pricing conditions (e.g., fans pay an exercise price in the future, whereas they pay in 
the present under advance selling), I asked fans to indicate their WTP the exercise price in the 
present should their favorite team make it through the tournament.  To control for the possibility 
that WTP may be influenced by the mere fact that choices become unavailable in the future (e.g., 
Ariely and Shin 2004), I asked fans to assume that both ticket types (options and regular) were 
                                                 
18
 Fans were explicitly instructed that a WTP of $0 for the exercise prices across all the uncertainty levels would be 
treated as if they did not want to purchase the option ticket. 
 
19
 We do not allow fans to choose both the option and the exercise price because we want to obtain their WTP 
without confounding our measures with individual differences in risk preferences. For example, suppose we allow 
subjects to state their willingness to pay for both the option and the exercise price, and one subject was willing to 
pay an option price of $50 and an exercise price of $100 given a 0.25 probability of her favorite team making it to 
the big game. Suppose another subject was willing to pay $25 for the option price and $100 as the exercise price 
given a 0.50 probability of her favorite team making it through the tournament. In this case, the expected value of 
both subjects’ willingness to pay is the same ($75). However, it can be argued that the first fan who was willing to 
pay more for the option when there was a lower probability of the team playing in the final game is more risk-averse 
than the latter.  
 
20
 Because we find no significant order effects in any of our analyses, we ignore this factor in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
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only available at the start of the season (before the uncertainty of the final team matchups has 
been resolved).    
Finally, because I also want to better understand the behavioral determinants of consumer 
willingness to pay under various pricing approaches, I follow Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) and 
measure fans’ risk preferences based on their responses to a lottery question (fans who are 
willing to pay less for the lottery than its expected value are considered to be risk-averse; these 
fans represent 81% of the sample).   
2.3.2  General Fan Reactions to Consumer Options 
To better understand fans’ perceptions of consumer options, I obtained open-ended 
feedback from respondents.  Overall, 90% of the sample thought that consumer options were 
simple to understand and 88% deemed the pricing mechanism to be fair. For example, one 
respondent thought the option ticket was fair “because it allows you to risk a small amount to 
gain something of much larger value.”   I also asked a separate sample of forty fans how fair they 
thought consumer options were after it was known that their favorite team was not going to be in 
the final game. I find that fans continue to view consumer options as a fair pricing mechanism ex 
post, even if their favorite team does not make it to the final game and they lose the option 
price21. 
2.3.3   Willingness to Pay 
 The sample distribution of fans’ valuations for a championship ticket not involving the 
favorite team is graphically depicted in Figure 6.  These WTP values are based on responses to 
the full information condition when the final outcome is known with certainty. This distribution 
suggests that there are two fan segments.  Consistent with Condition 1 in the analytical model, 
                                                 
21
 When γ is relatively small, a repeated measures ANOVA indicates that fans believe that consumer options are 
significantly more fair than regular tickets, even if they eventually do not exercise the option (F(2,40)=4.26, 
p<0.02).  
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respondents can be divided into team-based fans that are willing to pay zero to watch a team 
other than their favorite (representing 29% of the sample) and game-based fans indicating some 
non-zero valuation for attending a game without their favorite team.  Figure 7 shows the 
distribution of fans’ valuations for the preferred game.  Team-based fans are willing to pay an 
average price of $102 for a ticket to the championship game when it is known with certainty that 
their favorite team is playing, while game-based fans are willing to pay an average price of 
$179—this difference is statistically significant (t=5.07; p<0.01). These results imply that the 
game-based fans’ expected valuation for the game will be significantly higher than the team-
based fans’ expected valuation at any given uncertainty level22.  Consequently, these findings are 
consistent with Condition 2 in the analytical model. Further, a significantly greater proportion of 
the team-based fans are risk-averse as compared to the game-based fans (93% and 76%, 
respectively; t=3.08, p<0.01).  Thus, team-based fans are generally more risk-averse, have zero 
valuation for the non-preferred game, and value the preferred game significantly less than game-
based fans.    
                                                 
22
 At  γ=0.25, 0.50 and  0.75 the t values are 10.08, 8.04 and 6.30 respectively.. 
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Figure 6:  Fans’ Stated Valuation for the Non-Preferred Game under Full Information 
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Figure 7: Fans’ Stated Valuation for the Preferred Game under Full Information 
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Fans’ average WTP for Final Four tickets under various pricing arrangements are in Table 6.  
The results from the associated 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA is in Table 7. Not surprisingly, 
the WTP values in Table 7 are significantly different across pricing condition and uncertainty 
levels.  More interesting are the statistical results involving the interaction terms which can be 
interpreted by examining the relative magnitudes of the values in Table 7.  The significant 
interaction involving pricing condition and uncertainty level implies that fans in general are 
willing to pay more for consumer options when uncertainty is high (γ is small).  This result is 
entirely intuitive as consumer options give the most protection to fans when the final outcome is 
most uncertain.  The significant interaction between pricing condition and fan type indicates that 
team-based fans are willing to pay more for consumer options than game-based fans.  Again, this 
is very reasonable since team-based fans are much more sensitive to the teams playing in the 
final game than game-based fans.  Finally, the significant 3-way interaction involving pricing 
condition, uncertainty level and fan type implies team-based fans are willing to pay more for 
consumer options at every uncertainty level while game-based fans are most interested in 
consumer options only when uncertainty is high. 
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Table 6: Fans’ Average Stated Willingness to Pay under Different Pricing Arrangements 
 
 Game-Based Fans 
 
Team-Based Fans 
 
 
Full Information 
          γ=0.25 
          γ=0.50 
          γ=0.75 
 
 
 
$101.8 
$127.4 
$152.9 
 
$25.6 
$51.1 
$76.7 
 
Advanced Selling 
          γ=0.25 
          γ=0.50 
          γ=0.75 
 
 
 
$89.0    
$110.1 
$136.3 
 
$27.7 
$48.2 
$67.7 
 
Consumer Options 
          γ=0.25 
          γ=0.50  
          γ=0.75 
 
 
 
$116.8 
$125.1 
$129.3 
 
$64.6 
$82.3 
$111.6 
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 Table 7: Repeated Measures ANOVA (with fan type as a between-subject factor) 
(significance level in parentheses; n=151) 
 
 
 
 
Source 
 
 
Type III 
Mean Square 
 
 
F-statistic 
 
Pricing Condition 
 
Uncertainty Level 
 
Pricing Condition x Uncertainty Level 
 
Pricing Condition x Fan Type 
 
Uncertainty Level x Fan Type 
 
Pricing Condition x Uncertainty Level    
x Fan Type 
 
 
  60113.1 
 
161362.5 
 
     3694.2 
 
 36501.3 
 
    2009.7 
 
    4209.7 
 
 18.35 (0.000) 
 
128.42 (0.000) 
 
    5.36 (0.000) 
 
 11.14 (0.000) 
 
    1.60 (0.204) 
 
    6.11 (0.000) 
 
 
2.3.4  Firm Profits and Consumer Surplus 
 My empirical observations to this point suggest that fans have very different valuations 
for tickets to an uncertain championship game and consumer options represent a mechanism 
which affords fans flexibility in obtaining tickets in the face of this uncertainty.  Moreover, fans 
are generally very positive towards consumer options for sports tickets and are willing to pay 
more for consumer options than regular tickets.  I next consider the profit implications of this fan 
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behavior for the league.  Because I find empirical support for Conditions 1 and 2 in the 
analytical model, I expect profits from consumer options to be higher than profits from advance 
selling.   
 To compute profits, I calculate total demand at various prices using the individual-level 
WTP information. I then select the optimal price under each pricing strategy to be the price 
yielding the highest total profits23.  Profits per fan under advance selling and consumer options 
are reported in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Profit per Fan from Different Pricing Arrangements 
 
 
 
Advanced Selling 
 
Consumer Options 
 
Profit Premium from 
Consumer Options 
 
Game-Based Fans 
          γ=0.25 
          γ=0.50 
          γ=0.75 
 
 
$39.3 
$48.6 
$62.6 
 
$71.5 
$81.7 
$88.9 
 
1.8 
1.7 
1.4 
 
Team-Based Fans 
          γ=0.25 
          γ=0.50 
          γ=0.75 
 
 
$12.3    
$18.2 
$25.0 
 
$54.0 
$53.2 
$68.6 
 
4.4 
2.9 
2.7 
 
 
 As expected, profits from consumer options are considerably higher than those from 
advance selling (the profit premium or ratio of profit per fan from consumer options to advance 
                                                 
23
 For γ=0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, optimal regular ticket prices are $60, $80, $100, respectively; optimal prices under 
consumer options are Po=$60 and Pe=$20, $40 and $40, respectively. The profit difference between option pricing 
and advance selling was $5290, $5080 and  $4730 at uncertainty levels of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 respectively. 
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selling is greater than one).  And, the profit premium from consumer options for both game-
based and team-based fans is highest when there is greater uncertainty (γ is small).  More 
interesting, the profit premium per team-based fan from consumer options over advance selling 
is much higher than that of game-based fans.  This is consistent with the finding that team-based 
fans are generally willing to pay more for consumer options than other pricing arrangements (see 
Table 6).  Further, the calculated profit per fan in Table 8 shows that the consumer options profit 
premium from team-based fans is the highest when the final outcome is most uncertain.   
 Clearly, some of the additional profits from consumer options come from both the game-
based and team-based fans’ higher willingness to pay for the flexibility that consumer options 
affords them over purchasing a regular ticket at the beginning of the season.  In addition, I find 
evidence of demand expansion: fifty-four fans will only participate when offered consumer 
options (i.e., they are not willing to purchase a regular ticket in advance).  Interestingly, these 
fifty-four fans have a very low valuation for the non-preferred game (on average, they are only 
willing to pay $24.4 for the non-preferred game while the rest of the sample is willing to pay 
$72.1).  Moreover, of these fifty-four fans, twenty-three are team-based fans.  Thus, a 
disproportionate share of the extra fans attracted by consumer options are team-based fans (43% 
as compared to the 29% of the sample that are team-based fans).  Therefore option pricing is 
more profitable, at a given capacity, by changing the optimal mix of fans in the stadium. Further 
from the study it is clear that fans derive some positive externality from the presence of 
additional team-based fans. One fan commented: “The team ticket is fair because only loyal fans 
will pay in advance to reserve a seat.  As a fan I would be upset if the arena was full of people 
who did not care about the outcome of the game and just came there because they got the ticket 
for a good price.” Intuitively, as seen in Figure 8, consumer options seem to be particularly 
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desirable by risk-averse fans (i.e., fans that really have a preference for avoiding the non-
preferred outcome)24.  Nineteen fans do not participate under either advance selling or option 
pricing. These differences in fan valuations for the preferred and non-preferred games throw 
light on fans’ choice behaviors.  
 
Figure 8: Interaction of Average WTP Across Pricing Mechanisms and Risk Aversion   
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Full Information 
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W
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$140
$160
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Less Risk Averse
 
 
The empirical analyses to this point demonstrate that the league can earn a profit premium by 
pricing with consumer options.  But, how will fans fare under consumer options?  To calculate 
fan surplus, I subtract the optimal prices used to compute profits in Table 8 from each fan’s WTP 
                                                 
24
 The interaction of pricing condition (advance selling, option pricing, full information) with the risk aversion 
measure (more or less) is significant (F=12.28, p<0.001). The average WTP of fans across the different probabilities 
is shown for more versus less risk averse fans in Figure 8.  
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under the alternative pricing strategies.  Surplus per fan under advance selling and consumer 
options is reported in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Surplus per Fan from Different Pricing Arrangements 
 
 
 
Advanced Selling 
 
 
Consumer Options 
 
 
Surplus Premium from 
Consumer Options 
 
 
Game-Based Fans 
          γ=0.25 
          γ=0.50 
          γ=0.75 
 
 
$40.2 
$35.7 
$53.3 
 
$42.1 
$47.9 
$56.2 
 
1.1 
1.3 
1.1 
 
Team-Based Fans 
          γ=0.25 
          γ=0.50 
          γ=0.75 
 
 
$ 7.7   
$19.5 
$22.7 
 
$12.3 
$21.8 
$29.0 
 
1.6 
1.1 
1.3 
 
 Importantly, consumer surplus under both pricing arrangements is positive and greater 
than zero.  More interesting however, is the finding that fan surplus is always higher when 
pricing with consumer options than advanced selling (the surplus premium or ratio of surplus per 
fan from consumer options to advance selling is greater than one).  Further, I find that the 
consumer options surplus premium for team-based fans is the highest when the final outcome is 
most uncertain (γ is small).  Thus, consumer options do not unreasonably exploit fans’ higher 
willingness to pay even when the option ticket is most valuable.   
Given that option pricing is more profitable than advance selling how does option pricing 
result in more fan surplus as well? The profit difference between option pricing and advance 
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selling is the highest when the probability of the preferred game is the lowest. While option 
pricing can extract more surplus than advance selling the optimal price under option pricing does 
not increase enough to capture all of the increased WTP. This is because under option pricing 
both the option and the exercise prices are set early in the season. If the league could set the 
exercise price later in the season it can extract fan’s surplus more effectively. However, the 
league needs to set both the option and the exercise price early on in the season due to fairness 
constraints. This implies that, under lower probabilities, fans have an enhanced willingness-to-
pay for an option ticket which is not completely extracted by the optimal prices, leaving them 
with more surplus than under advance selling. Under higher probabilities fans are WTP more for 
the ticket under both advance selling and option pricing - this is the main effect associated with 
an increased likelihood of the preferred outcome. However, because the uncertainty is low under 
higher probabilities, the value of the option is low. Correspondingly, the optimal price that is 
charged under option pricing is even lower than the advance selling price. Therefore, across the 
probabilities, surplus from option pricing remains higher than that under advance selling. With 
full information pricing because ticket prices are set after knowing the teams that are playing in 
the game it extracts fan surplus most efficiently. Therefore fan surplus under option pricing is 
always higher than that under full information pricing.   
Together, these empirical results suggest that consumer options creates a win-win 
situation for the league and fans—pricing with consumer options generates more profits for the 
league than advance selling, as well as more surplus for fans.  Even if the league is not solely 
interested in maximizing its profits (e.g., if enhancing fan surplus is desirable), pricing with 
consumer options will outperform advance selling. 
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2.4 DISCUSSION  
 In this chapter, I empirically validated and modeled the concept of option pricing in a 
sports market setting. I compare the profitability of three pricing mechanisms: (a) advance 
selling, where the league sets the price before the uncertainty regarding the teams that will play 
in the tournament is resolved; (b) full information pricing, where the league sets prices after this 
uncertainty is resolved; and (c) option pricing, where the league charges an upfront option price 
that offers fans the right but not the obligation to see the game, and an exercise price that fans 
who purchased the option can choose to pay once the uncertainty is resolved. I determine the 
conditions under which the league can use option pricing to obtain profits that can equal or 
exceed those from advance selling and full information pricing. With a simple two-fan analytical 
model I show that option pricing can completely extract the surplus of both fans. Any other 
pricing mechanism can at best equal profits from option pricing.   
I empirically verified the profitability of option pricing over the other pricing 
mechanisms. I found that (a) fans are willing to pay most for option pricing under the lower 
probabilities when the value of option pricing is the highest (b) risk-averse fans are willing to 
pay more for option pricing (c) profitability from option pricing is the highest across the 
probabilities (d) the profit gap between option pricing and advance selling is the highest when 
the probability of the favorite team making it to the tournament was the lowest and (e) fan 
surplus is higher under option pricing compared to the other pricing mechanisms.  
One possible concern that arises under option pricing is what to do with the unexercised 
options (if any). The league certainly does not want to have empty seats in the stadium. 
Practically, the league can set a date within which the options need to be exercised. The league 
can then resell the unexercised options. Gerstner and Xie (2003) suggest making customer 
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cancellations easier so league can profit from resale of advance tickets. I believe that getting fans 
to inform the league of their cancellations of ‘regular’ tickets (especially to events like the Final 
Four or the Super bowl) will be hard, no matter how easy the cancellation is made. However, if 
fans do not exercise their option within a certain date then they lose the right to the option and 
the league now has possession of the ticket which it can resell. Note that the current profitability 
of option pricing does not take into account the potential additional profitability from resale. 
Further, with option pricing the league can continue to set prices at time 1 as it has always done.  
These findings highlight the value of consumer options in protecting the league and the 
fans. It protects the fan from making a substantial upfront investment when the probability of the 
preferred outcome is low. Option pricing provides team-based fans, who have value in waiting to 
purchase their tickets, with a viable alternative to scalpers. Option pricing leaves some surplus 
with fans by charging a lower price than the created surplus. Further, from the open-ended 
feedback I received it is clear that fans perceive option pricing will generate positive externality 
from bringing in more fans who are passionate about their teams. For the league option pricing is 
an innovative way to continue selling tickets early in the season and make more profits. Fans 
who pay the reserve deposit upfront do not need to approach scalpers to purchase a ticket after 
the uncertainty about the game is resolved. Profits from scalping do not flow into the league’s 
coffers – therefore, option pricing can help shore up profits and lessen the league’s vulnerability 
to scalping. Option pricing can come in handy as an alternate way of pricing to season ticket 
holders. Because season tickets are sold in advance and for all games in the season, fans are 
forced to buy season tickets fearing that tickets may become unavailable for the games they 
would like to attend. A byproduct of this is that fans who may not want to attend all the games 
end up reselling the tickets in the secondary market. The league can reduce the secondary market 
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activity by using option pricing. With option pricing fans can buy tickets to the games that they 
really care to attend. Fans can wait and watch the teams’ performances before deciding whether 
or not they want to attend a particular game. Buying the option gives the fans access to a ticket 
later in the season.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION  
Because profits under option pricing are greater than expected profits under full 
information pricing, this implies that although the league sells tickets at the beginning of the 
season, it can obtain the same profits as it would if it priced after the uncertainty has been 
revealed. This result has implications for a range of markets in which consumers face 
uncertainties but where the firm may find it difficult to set prices after the uncertainty is 
resolved.  
The concept of the consumer option can be extended, with appropriate modifications, to 
other situations where consumers face uncertain market-level outcomes. For example, consider 
the market for High Definition Television sets (HDTV). Consumer uncertainty about the variety 
of programming available in HD format has been a key impediment to the growth of HDTV 
sales over the past few years (Bryant 2007). This uncertainty can also suppress market prices and 
sales for large-screen, non-HDTV sets because consumers do not want to be saddled with a 
large, sunk investment in outdated technology when HDTV arrives. In this situation, the TV 
manufacturer could encourage the consumer to purchase a conventional large screen TV along 
with an option. The option, which would expire at a certain point in time in the future, would 
allow the consumer to pay an exercise price and buy a new HDTV-capable set at a reduced price 
(or alternatively, pay the exercise price and buy a HD module that can be integrated into the 
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existing TV set). Consumers who did not feel that there was sufficient HD programming 
available to make the exercise of the option worthwhile would let it expire, whereas others would 
exercise it.  
Likewise, consumers who would like to protect themselves against the risk of sold-out 
flights to Florida in the winter can buy a flight ticket option (with an expiration date by which 
time it needs to be exercised) that covers flights for a fixed set of dates. If the weather in Florida 
turns out to be pleasant close to the exercise date the consumer can exercise the option and buy 
the ticket. The firm can charge a higher option price if the consumer wants more flexibility – i.e., 
if the consumer is willing to exercise the option, say, three weeks before the travel date the price 
of the option can be lower than if she is willing to exercise it, say, three days before the travel 
date. Therefore, while I have focused primarily on sports markets there are other applications for 
the option pricing concept.  
The current analysis has some limitations. First, fans and the league could have different 
estimates of the popular game occurring in the tournament.  Having a distribution of the 
probability estimates across fans could imply that the fans’ valuations of a specific pricing 
mechanism will not just be a function of their utilities and the prices but also of their probability 
estimates. Second, I did not consider hybrid pricing strategies that simultaneously offer a mix of 
option, advance selling and full information pricing. Depending on the circumstances, such a 
menu of pricing mechanisms may yield higher profits than any of the mechanisms implemented 
on a stand-alone basis. Finally, adding modeling the presence of scalpers explicitly could result 
in lower demand across all pricing mechanisms. I hope to consider hybrid pricing mechanisms 
and scalpers in future research.  
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This chapter is but an early step towards examining the performance of consumer options 
from an analytical and empirical perspective. The idea of option ticket pricing resonated with 
both league officials and university athletic officials I interviewed during the course of the study. 
In the empirical study, the majority of the respondents thought that option pricing was a good 
idea – one that was both fair and easy to understand. Both analytically and experimentally, I 
demonstrated that option pricing could enhance league profits over existing pricing mechanisms. 
Despite all these positives, much remains to be done to fully understand the benefits and the 
drawbacks of consumer options. I hope this chapter sparks further research and managerial 
interest in this area.  
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 3: 
AN EXPLORATION OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR IN AN ONLINE 
MARKET FOR FORWARD TICKETS 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recently a number of firms are introducing ‘consumer forwards’ as a way of helping 
consumers minimize their exposure to risk in a variety of markets. Some firms (firstdibz.com) 
have introduced forwards for consumer products that are popular and hard to obtain (e.g., 3G 
iphones, special blue-ray compatible versions of PlayStation games etc). Other firms 
(yoonew.com, ticketoption.com) have introduced ‘forward tickets’ to help fans obtain tickets to 
tournament games in sports markets. A consumer forward is different from a consumer option 
(defined in chapter 1) in that it is tied, in the context of sports tickets, to a particular team. If the 
team does not make it through to the final, the forward expires. Tickets to tournament games are 
typically sold in advance when fans are unaware of the teams that will be playing in them. If fans 
choose to wait and buy tickets after the uncertainty regarding the competing teams is resolved, 
tickets can be scarce and exorbitantly priced. Buying a forward early on gives the fan the right to 
exercise it later should she decide to attend the game. In this chapter I estimate models to 
understand fan behaviors in a consumer forwards market for sports tickets. 
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The most closely related literature to the consumer forwards market is that of individual 
investors mitigating portfolio risk in financial markets. However, consumer markets are 
structured differently from financial markets. For example, assumptions of no arbitrage or 
frictionless markets that are used to price forwards in financial markets do not apply to consumer 
markets25. Further, the individuals who participate in these markets are different. Investors in 
financial markets tend to be more savvy than the average fan buying a sports ticket. Also, 
whereas investors in financial markets may be indifferent between two stocks offering them the 
same returns, in sports markets fans have preferences towards certain teams. Given the 
differences between consumer and financial markets I study whether conventional wisdom on 
risk management in financial markets applies to consumer markets.   
I study factors that mitigate fans’ risk in the Final Four forwards market. In the traditional 
finance literature different types of investor behavior are not studied -  the focus is more on the 
‘typical’ investor. In this chapter, however, I recognize the presence of different types of fans 
and estimate different models to capture their differences in behaviors. 
Because the consumer forwards market is still fairly new the specifics of how the market 
works is first detailed.  Fans objectives are outlined in the conceptual framework section. I then 
hypothesize and operationalize consumer risk mitigation strategies in this environment. Finally I 
present the estimation results and implications for future research. 
3.1.1 How the consumer forwards market works 
The process is depicted in Figure 9. If a consumer (hereafter, a “fan”) is interested in attending a 
game in which her favorite team is playing, she could purchase the team’s forward by paying a 
                                                 
25
 Further, in financial markets individual investors are advised to invest in riskless assets (such as index funds or t-
bills) to reduce portfolio volatility. In ticket markets there could be less risky teams but there are no ‘risk free’ 
teams. For example, in the last seven years, of the 28 teams that made it through to the men’s Final Four tournament 
only 6 teams had made it there more than once. A team is rarely a ‘sure shot’!  
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preset “forward price.” Fans can buy forwards for multiple teams across many athletic 
conferences.  Forward prices vary by team and over time. If the fan’s favorite team makes it past 
the preliminary rounds and all the way to the tournament, she then pays an additional exercise 
price (set by the National Collegiate Athletic Association – hereafter ‘the league’) to buy the 
ticket. The exercise price varies from year to year and is the same as the face value of the ticket.  
For example, the league has set the exercise price for the Final Four tournament between $140-
$160 in the previous years. The exercise price is set in advance and the fans are aware of this 
price at the time that they purchase the forward. The forward price (set by the firm that offers 
forwards for sale) that was paid earlier is the price of a reservation to buy a ticket should the 
team play in the tournament. If the specific team for which the forward was purchased does not 
make it to the tournament the fan loses the forward price. At any time in between the purchase of 
the forward and until the uncertainty is revealed fans have access to the firm’s proprietary market 
in which they can resell their forwards. The firm obtains revenue from its sale of forwards and a 
certain percentage of the transactions between the fans in its marketplace (a buyer and seller fee 
of 5%). However, once the fans exercise their forwards the league gets the associated revenue. 
Figure 9: Consumer Decision Sequence in a Forwards Market 
Fan buys team-specific forward 
(pays ‘forward price’ set by firm)
Fan pays the exercise price 
=face value (league)
Team makes it to 
the game
Team does not make 
it to the game
Fan loses the forward price
Between the time the 
forward is bought and 
the uncertainty is 
resolved, the fan can 
resell the forward
 
In the next section I present a detailed description of the data. 
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3.2 DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
I obtained data from a large, well-known, firm that offers team-specific forwards for various 
events. On the firm’s website forwards are defined as “tradable reservations for a face value 
ticket to see your favorite team if they participate in an event.” Due to non-disclosure agreements 
the name of the firm cannot be revealed and it will simply be referred to as ‘the firm’. The firm 
initially offered forwards only to the NCAA Final Four market. Now, along with the Final Four, 
it offers forwards for events like the Super Bowl, the AFC and NFC Championships, College 
Football Bowl games, BCS National Championship, the NBA Conference Semi-Finals and the 
NBA Finals.  
The firm shared data on all the transactions that occurred in the Final Four market in 
2006 (from April 2005 to March 2006). Each fan was allowed to purchase a maximum of eight 
forwards per team. Forward prices ranged from $5 to $800 per forward depending on the team 
and the time that the forward was bought. Each bidder has a unique id; giving us the ability to 
track each bidders’ purchase and resale behavior, if resale occurred. The data is organized at the 
transaction-level. In each transaction, details on the following issues are available: (a) which 
team the bidder bought the forward for, (b) the number of units bid on, (c) whether the forward 
was bought from the firm (termed an ‘issuance’) or from another bidder (‘trade’), (d) the price 
the forward was purchased for, (e) the day and time of purchase. If the forward was subsequently 
sold by the bidder there is information on: (a) the sale price, (b) the timing of the sale and (c) the 
identity of the buyer. Forwards could be sold to other bidders; it cannot be sold back to the firm.  
I complemented the existing data with Associated Press (AP) polls on the ranking for the 
various teams across all the weeks of the regular season26. Note that better performing teams 
                                                 
26
 Team rankings (between ranks 1 and 50) are available through the length of the regular season (till week 18). 
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have lower ranks. The objective of the analysis is to understand fans’ behaviors in terms of 
minimizing their risk in this environment – therefore scalpers are removed from the dataset. The 
procedure that was used to eliminate scalpers is described next. 
3.2.1 Removing Scalpers From The Dataset 
A team is considered to be ‘performing well’ in a given week if it has a better rank in that week 
than in the previous week. Scalpers are defined as those who sell their forwards even when the 
team is performing well. This implies that those fans who never resold their forwards were 
automatically exempted from being classified as scalpers. On average, across all teams, fans 
received a higher resale price when the team was performing well. Therefore, if fans resold their 
forwards when their teams’ were not performing well they were not considered to be scalpers; 
merely fans who were minimizing their losses. For instance these may be fans who, due to a 
schedule conflict, are unable to attend the game and would like to sell their forward. Before 
eliminating scalpers the dataset had 3196 transactions with 582 unique bidders who bought 
forwards of 83 unique teams. Upon removing the scalpers we are left with 431 unique fans who 
engaged in a total of 2129 transactions across all 83 unique teams27.  
Among the 431 bidders there were clearly two groups of people: (a) those who bought 
(and sold) forwards on only one team (labeled ‘team-based’ fans) and (b) fans who bought and 
sold multiple teams’ forwards (labeled ‘game-based’ fans) . In the data there were 216 unique 
game-based fans. Most game-based fans bought forwards for 2 to 10 unique teams; few bought 
forwards for more than 10 unique teams. The frequency plot of the number of unique teams 
                                                 
27
 As a robustness check I estimated a logit model of resale behavior with teams’ performance as one of the 
independent variables. When the analysis was run on the entire data the performance of the teams was insignificant. 
However when the sample was restricted  to scalper-free data, teams’ performance was significant  (p = 0.014) and 
negative (the worse the team, the higher the likelihood of resale), as expected. This confirms that we removed those 
who did not consider team performance as a factor in resale, typically scalpers, from the dataset. 
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game-based fans bought is shown in Figure 10. On average, game-based fans bought 5 unique 
teams’ forwards.   
Figure 10: Number of Unique Teams Bought By Game-Based Fans 
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Of all the fan transactions only 20% of the transactions were made on teams that 
eventually made it to the final game. The fact that 80% of the transactions were done on the 
‘wrong’ teams increases the value of understanding fan behavior in this market. Because scalpers 
have been removed from the dataset I assume that the objective of the remaining consumers 
(fans) who buy the ticket is to attend the final game. I discuss the components of the fans’ utility 
next. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
Consistent with standard economic theory we assume that game- and team-based fans 
maximize their utility (Jehle and Reny 2003). Fans’ utility maximization problem is given by: 
Max (U (attending game) - Price)     (37) 
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As stated in eqn. (37) fans have utility in attending the game (the utility of not attending 
the game is normalized to be zero). Forwards expire if the team that it is associated with does not 
make it to the tournament. Therefore it becomes important for the fans to buy forwards on the 
‘right’ teams. Further, even if the team makes it to the tournament, unless the fan retains a 
forward she cannot attend the game (i.e., if she resells all her forwards she cannot attend the 
game). Therefore, for the fan, the utility of attending the game is composed of two components: 
(a) picking the right teams and (b) retaining at least some of the purchased forwards on the 
winning teams.  
The other aspect in the utility maximization problem relates to the price paid. We assume, 
ceteris paribus, that fans prefer to spend less on the purchase of a forward. In this market fans 
have the ability to resell their forwards and ‘offset’ their expenses. Therefore, after accounting 
for the money obtained through resale and the money spent on purchase, the fan’s objective 
would be to be in the black (so as to not spend disproportionately more than the amount 
received).  
Though all fans buy forwards so that they can attend the final game, we allow for the fact 
that different types of fans may have different objectives. Game-based fans have a portfolio of 
different teams’ forwards; therefore we assume that they have a dual objective of ‘picking the 
right teams to maximize chances of attending the game’ while simultaneously ‘minimizing the 
associated costs.’ I estimate an ordered logit model that identifies factors that affect the dual 
objectives of game-based fans. Most team-based fans (156 of the 215 fans) do not resell their 
teams’ forwards irrespective of their teams’ performance. Because team-based fans choose to 
buy forwards to one team and hold onto them irrespective of their teams’ performance, I make 
the assumption that their choice of team is driven by their loyalty (and not by a conscious 
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decision to ‘pick’ any one team) 28. Therefore their only objective is to minimize the amount that 
they spend on the forward. I estimate a regression model that identifies factors that reduce the 
amount paid by the team-based fan. Next, I discuss the dependent and independent measures that 
will be used in the estimations. 
3.4 Measures 
Based on the utility maximization framework, different dependent variables for the game- and 
team-based fans are created.  
3.4.1 Dependent Variables: 
Team-based fans seek to minimize their spending. Because this market has both purchase and 
resale behavior, I matched each bidder’s purchase of a given team forward with its sale (if 
applicable). The variable ‘net dollars’ which indicates the difference between the total amount 
obtained through resale and the total amount spent on purchasing the forward in a given 
transaction is created. In a market with resale, minimizing costs amounts to maximizing the ‘net 
dollars’ variable. Therefore, the dependent variable in the team-based fans’ regression is the ‘net 
dollars’ variable. For game-based fans there is an additional objective: of picking the ‘right’ 
teams to purchase forwards on. Because these transactions have occurred in the past, I 
retrospectively know which teams eventually made it to the Final Four tournament in 2006. 
Therefore I have the unique ability to classify a transaction (ex post) as being ‘good’ (if the 
transaction was on a team that eventually made it to the final game) or ‘bad’ (if the transaction 
was on a team that eventually did not make it to the final game)29. If the game-based fan had 
forwards on teams that eventually made it to the final game and the fan held onto at least one 
                                                 
28
 This assumption is relaxed later. 
 
29
 Teams that made it to the Final Four in 2006 were Louisiana State Tigers, UCLA Bruins, Florida Gators and 
George Mason Colonials. That year the National Champions were the Florida Gators. 
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forward from the winning team, we assume the fan attends the game (and the ‘attend game’ 
variable is set to 1). The dependent variable for the game-based fans analysis is a variable termed 
‘rank’ which combines game-based fans dual objective of attending the game at the least 
possible cost. Game-based fans who attend the final game are classified as being ranked better 
than those who do not. Further, among those fans who attended the final game, those who spent 
the least amount of money (i.e., those with higher ‘net dollars’) are ranked better than those who 
spent more. Specifically, the following cutoffs were established to compute the ‘rank’ variable: 
 If the forward was bought on a team that ultimately made it to the final game and it 
was held till the end (i.e., if ‘attend game’ = 1): 
o If, on a given transaction, the fan spent less on forwards than she obtained 
through resale (i.e., if ‘net dollars’ >= $0) her out of pocket expenses are 
minimized. In this case the best possible rank (i.e., rank 1) was assigned.  
o If, on a given transaction, the fan spent more than she obtained through 
resale (i.e., if ‘net dollars’ < $0), rank 2 was assigned. 
 If the forward was bought on a team that did not make it to the final or if the forward 
was resold (i.e., if ‘attend game’ = 0): 
o If, on a given transaction, the fan spent less on forwards than she obtained 
through resale (i.e., if ‘net dollars’ >= $0), rank 3 was assigned. 
o If, on a given transaction, the fan spent more than she obtained through 
resale (i.e., if ‘net dollars’ < $0), rank 4 was assigned. 
Because we construct the ‘rank’ variable as a discrete (but ordered) categorical variable we 
estimate the model using an ordered logit model. As stated earlier most of the transactions were 
not made on winning teams; this implies that most of the transactions were assigned ranks 3 or 4.  
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3.4.2 Independent Variables: 
Because their objectives are different, I create different independent variables for the game- and 
team-based fans. Game-based fans have portfolios of different forwards; therefore understanding 
strategies that enable them to create and manage ‘winning’ portfolios is of value (and interest). 
Stated in terms of the dependent variable, the goal is to identify and understand factors that 
enable game-based fans to have a better rank (rank 1 being the best). Helping the game-based 
fans meet their objectives consists of two components: (1) managing the risk in their portfolios 
and (2) minimizing their costs. For team-based fans I seek to identify factors that minimize costs. 
I begin with the cost-minimization variables that affect both fan types.  
Cost minimization strategies: 
One strategy that fans could use to minimize their cost is to time their purchase (and sale). The 
operationalization of the corresponding independent variables are discussed below: 
(a) Purchase Timing: A cross-tabulation reveals that on average fans spend $60 to buy a 
forward if they buy early versus $138 if they buy late. Buying early can therefore help 
the fan by minimizing her cost30. If the forward was bought in the pre-season or 
within the first 10 weeks of the regular season it is classified as an early buy (if the 
forward was bought after week 10 and into the tournament season it is classified as a 
late buy). Around the end of the first 10 weeks, the new year sets in and a newer, 
more frenzied chapter in the season begins. Therefore I use the 10 week mark as the 
natural division between early and late buys.  
                                                 
30
 While it can be argued that buying late allows fans to have more information which may guide their buying choice 
better, it can be counter argued that even if they bought the forward early fans could always sell the forward based 
on the changing team performance (new information). 
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(b) Sale Timing: Resale, per se, helps increase the fans’ ‘net dollars’. Further selling 
early helps the fan minimize her risk. Whereas selling late, on average, commands a 
higher price ($153 versus $130) if the team performs well, there is a risk associated 
with waiting for too long. If the team is performing badly the fan may not be able to 
recoup the amount she paid to buy the forward. Worse still, if the fan waits till the 
tournament begins, the team may not make it past a certain round and the forward 
becomes worthless instantaneously. If the forward is resold in the pre-season or 
within the first 10 weeks of the regular season, it is classified as an early sale 
(forwards that are resold later are classified as late sales).  
(c) Type of purchase (Issuance versus Trade): The average sellers’ price per forward 
is higher for a trade ($172) than an issuance ($97). This reveals that the firm is 
pricing more conservatively compared to what the market is willing to bear. From a 
fan’s perspective buying an issuance seems to be a cost minimization strategy. I 
create a ‘trade type’ variable that is coded ‘1’ or ‘0’ depending on whether or not the 
transaction is a trade or an issuance respectively.  
Extant literature in finance offers some insights on managing individual investors’ portfolio risk. 
We use these insights to motivate game-based fans’ risk-management strategies. 
Risk-management strategies: 
(d) Portfolio Breadth:  
i. Linear effects: In line with the existing literature in finance (Markowitz 
1952), diversifying a game-based fan’s portfolio is hypothesized to be a better 
risk-management strategy. In this setting a diversified portfolio amounts to 
having many unique teams’ forwards. As the number of unique teams in a 
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fan’s portfolio increases, this increases the fans’ chances of attending the 
game. For each bidder, I create a measure of portfolio breadth: a count of the 
total number of unique teams that the fan held in her portfolio till the end of 
the regular season. On average game-based fans held about 4 teams in their 
portfolio till the very end. Team-based fans, by definition, have a single team 
in their portfolio. Therefore even though they could be left with zero or one 
team at the end of the regular season, adding this variable to the team-based 
fan analysis is of limited value. This is because the recommendation of having 
more (or less) unique teams does not apply to team-based fans who have a 
single team in their portfolio. 
ii. Non-linear effects: As the number of unique teams increase so does the cost 
associated with the purchase of multiple fan forwards. As hypothesized in the 
finance literature (Berger and Ofek 1995, Kennon 2007), beyond a certain 
threshold the incremental value of an additional portfolio  investment (buying 
an additional team, in this case) is lesser than the cost involved. To capture 
this effect for game-based fans I introduce a quadratic term that represents the 
square of the number of unique teams a game-based fan possesses. As with 
the linear case, this variable is not applicable for the team-based fan analysis. 
(e) Portfolio Risk: As the number of unique teams in the portfolio increases, the 
variance of teams in terms of their rankings also increases. Consistent with the 
wisdom in portfolio management (Stein and DeMuth 2008) as the portfolio risk 
increases it has a negative effect on the fans’ chances of attending the game. I create a 
“spread” variable that captures the difference in ranking at the end of the regular 
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season between the highest and lowest ranked teams in each game-based fan’s 
portfolio. In other words the spread captures the gap in the best and worst teams’ 
performance in a fan’s portfolio. If the portfolio has better ranked teams the spread 
measure is adjusted (and renamed as ‘portfolio risk’) to reflect this. The portfolio risk 
measure is created to reflect the differences between portfolios with the same gap (the 
gap between teams with rankings 1 and 11 is the same as the gap between teams 
ranked 21 and 31; in the first case the portfolio risk is lower than in the second).  
Because the team-based fan has a single team in her portfolio, the portfolio risk 
variable is not applicable for team-based fans. 
(f) Team Performance (‘Rank Deviation’): Investors have been cautioned against 
chasing recent performers (Stein and DeMuth 2008). In our context, I check to see if 
buying a team that is coming off a recent win can be a better strategy to pick the right 
teams (than buying one that is coming off a loss). In other words I check the 
effectiveness of the strategy of buying a team that at week t is performing better 
relative to its performance at week t-1. I create a ‘rank deviation’ variable which is 
the difference in team ranking at the week of purchase from that in the previous week. 
If the rank deviation is positive it implies the team is performing worse in the current 
week. Though this variable is classified as capturing a risk-minimization strategy it is 
plausible that this strategy can be used to minimize costs as well. So I use this 
variable in the team-based fan analysis as well. 
(g) Expert Predictions (‘Pre-season picks’ and ‘Mid-season picks’): Finally, a 
recommended risk-mitigation strategy for individual investors involves composing 
the majority of their portfolio with stocks from reputed firms (Stein and DeMuth 
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2008). To draw a parallel to the sports teams context I obtained the ‘top 5 winningest 
teams of all time’ from the NCAA website (Johnson 2007). At least in the last few 
years (since 2004) it seems experts have picked most of their recommendations for 
the Final Four teams from this list: Duke, Kansas, Kentucky, UCLA, UNC – all 
storied teams in college basketball history. So in this context the hypothesis is that 
fans would be increasing their chances of attending the game by heeding expert 
predictions.  
Expert predictions are made twice during the season – once before the season 
begins (week 1) and the other about mid way through the season (week 11). Pre-
season picks reflect experts’ predictions before the teams start playing in the regular 
season.  These predictions are based on how the teams performed in the previous 
season. Mid-season picks reflect an updating by experts; depending on the teams’ 
performance in the current season they make revisions to their pre-season forecasts. I 
hypothesize that both pre- and mid-season picks help fans make the purchases on the 
‘right’ teams – the mid-season picks possibly help the fan more than pre-season picks 
(in terms of coefficient size). I obtained expert predictions from the Entertainment 
and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) website’s Coaches Poll during the 2005-
2006 season.  The week 1 predictions were labeled “pre-season picks” and their week 
11 predictions were labeled “mid-season picks”31.  
Because heeding expert predictions could be used as a strategy to reduce losses, 
this strategy also has cost implications. Therefore I use this variable in the team-based 
fan analysis as well. 
                                                 
31
 The pre-season favorites were Duke, Villanova, UConn, Mich. St. and Texas. The mid-season favorites were 
UConn, Duke, Memphis, Florida and Texas. 
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3.4.3 Control Variables: 
(h) Conference: I control for the fact that there may be certain conferences that people 
would be willing to spend more on because of their history in making it to the 
championship games. Dummy variables indicating the team’s conference are created. 
Since all conferences are not uniformly represented in the data I choose some that are 
well-represented. These include the SEC, Pac 10, Missouri Valley, Conference USA, 
Big East, Big Ten, Big Twelve, Atlantic 10 and the ACC.  
(i)  Units Bid On: The number of units bid on for a given team typically tends to be a 
function of how many friends the fan is going to the game with. If the fan purchases 
multiple forwards for a single team, the dollars spent increases without increasing the 
chances of attending the game. Therefore this variable needs to be controlled for.   
3.5 MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
Summary statistics for game- and team-based fans are presented in Table 10. On average most 
game- and team-based fans buy and sell late. Most team-based fans, on average, buy from others 
whereas game-based fans buy from the firm. Portfolio breadth indicates the number of unique 
teams held by fans at the end of the regular season. Because team-based fans have only one 
unique team in their portfolio they could be left with no teams or one team at the end of the 
regular season. The majority of team-based fans (77%) hold onto their one team till the very end; 
game-based fans hold about four unique teams till the end. A higher portfolio risk value indicates 
a higher risk – for game-based fans the average portfolio risk is low indicating that most game-
based fans held teams that were, on average, performing well. Team-based fans’ buy more risky 
teams (p=0.001). Finally, on average, team-based fans buy two forwards; game-based fans buy 
three forwards.  
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Table 10: Summary Statistics 
 
GB Fans TB Fans 
Variable Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
Bidder Buys Early 0 1 0.24 0 1 0.42 
Bidder Sells Early 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.08 
Trade type 0 1 0.49 0 1 0.60 
Rank Deviation32 -24 42 0.62 -9 42 0.55 
Portfolio Breadth 0 33 4.39 0 1 0.77 
Portfolio Risk 0 3 1.23 0 3 1.78 
Units Bid On 1 8 3.22 1 8 2.42 
 
Spearman correlations among the independent variables are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11: Correlations 
 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 Bidder Buys Early  (a) 1.00      
 Bidder Sells Early  (b) 0.35 1.00     
 Trade type              (c) -0.30 -0.12 1.00    
 Rank Deviation      (d) -0.06 -0.00 -0.05 1.00   
 Portfolio Breadth    (e) -0.12 0.01 -0.06 0.00 1.00  
 Portfolio Risk         (f) 0.39 0.08 -0.44 0.26 -0.00 1.00 
 
3.5.1 Results 
Estimation results of regression models I and  II are presented in Table 12, results of the 
game-based fan’s probit model (model II) is presented in Table 13, results of the ordered logit 
models (models IV and V) are reported in Table 14.  Because the data is at the transaction-level 
standard errors are clustered to control for the effect of the same bidder engaging in many 
transactions. I begin with the team-based fan regression model in model I33.  
                                                 
32
 Rank deviation = Current week rank – Previous week rank. Therefore higher rank deviation implies the team is 
performing worse at the week of purchase compared to the week before. The ‘-24’ case, for instance,  represents a 
current week ranking of 15 and a previous week ranking of 39. Similarly the ‘42’ ranking represents the case where 
the current rank is 42 and the previous week the team was not ranked in the top 50 (these teams are coded as rank 0). 
33
 I have verified that the results of the regression model with the ‘amount paid’ as the dependent variable (instead of 
the difference in amount obtained through resale minus amount paid) are similar to those presented in Model I. 
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Table 12: Results of Estimations of Regression Models (I and II) 
 
Variable 
Model I: 
TB Fan 
Regression 
Model 
 
Model II: 
GB Fan 
Regression 
Model 
Dependent Variable: Net dollars Net dollars 
constant 181.23* 179.19* 
Independent Variables:   
Buy Early 62.34 50.72 
Sell Early 138.09* -17.95 
Trade type -117.18* -247.91* 
Rank Deviation 4.80* 1.76 
Pre-season picks N/A 298.95* 
Mid-season picks N/A -110.21* 
Portfolio Breadth Linear N/A -23.65* 
Portfolio Breadth Quadratic N/A 0.566* 
Portfolio Risk N/A 45.49 
Control Variables:   
Conference SEC -37.14 81.47* 
Conference PAC10 -1.19 72.15 
Conference ACC -191.45* -42.20 
Conference Big East -114.02* -19.47 
Conference Big Ten -127.99* -82.92* 
Conference Big Twelve -111.49* 39.84 
Conference Atlantic10 -72.41 68.44 
Conference USA -106.21* 121.07 
Conference Missouri Valley -80.22 56.65 
Units bid on -70.64* -68.57* 
   
Number of observations 205 1195 
Number of unique bidders 187 168 
R2 0.23 0.39 
                               *: significant at 0.05 
 
77 
Table 13: Results of Estimations of GB Fans’ Probit Model (III) 
 
Variable 
Model III: 
GB Fan Probit 
Model 
Dependent Variable: Attend game 
Constant -1.15 
Independent Variables:  
Buy Early -0.86* 
Trade type -1.42* 
Rank Deviation -0.12* 
Mid-season picks 0.82* 
Portfolio Breadth Linear 0.05 
Portfolio Breadth Quadratic -0.0002 
Portfolio Risk -0.572* 
Control Variables:  
Conference SEC 2.25* 
Conference PAC10 1.99* 
Units bid on -0.08 
  
Number of observations 353 
Number of unique bidders 116 
Pseudo R2 0.47 
                               *: significant at 0.05 
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Table 14: Results of Estimations of the Ordered Logit Models (IV, V) 
 
Variable 
Model IV: 
GB Fan 
ordered 
Logit 
Model 
 
Model V: 
Entire 
Sample 
Ordered 
Logit 
Model 
Dependent Variable: Rank Rank 
Independent Variables:   
Buy Early 1.616* 1.453* 
Sell Early 1.785* 1.798* 
Trade type -0.480 -0.689* 
Rank Deviation 0.090* 0.086* 
Pre-season picks 1.093* 0.899* 
Mid-season picks 0.816* 0.867* 
Portfolio Breadth Linear -0.148* -0.064 
Portfolio Breadth Quadratic 0.002 0.0005 
Portfolio Risk -0.189 -0.201 
Control Variables:   
Conference SEC -2.145* -2.142* 
Conference PAC10 -1.756* -2.269* 
Conference ACC -0.182 -0.255 
Conference Big East 0.139 0.012 
Conference Big Ten -0.390 -0.463 
Conference Big Twelve 0.253 -0.001 
Conference Atlantic10 -0.483 -0.159 
Conference USA 0.585 0.347 
Conference Missouri Valley 0.815 0.702 
Units bid on -0.128 -0.160* 
1λ  -5.69 -5.25 
2λ  -5.49 -5.07 
3λ  0.60 0.744 
Number of observations 1195 1400 
Number of unique bidders 168 355 
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.27 
                               *: significant at 0.05 
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As stated earlier, the team-based fan’s objective is to minimize out of pocket expenses 
(i.e., amount got through resale minus the amount paid on purchase); therefore, I estimate a 
regression model for team-based fans with ‘net dollars’ as the dependent variable (model I). The 
independent variables that have a positive coefficient increase net dollars (and minimize costs) 
and are therefore deemed to be helpful. Selling early helps team-based fans because the amount 
obtained through resale is about the same, on average, irrespective of when she resells. Buying 
from other fans (engaging in a ‘trade’ as opposed to an ‘issuance’) hurts ‘net dollars’ because of 
the higher cost of trades. If a team is coming off a bad performance relative to the previous week 
(‘rank deviation’ variable is increasing) its resale price does not drop immediately. Because 
selling off the forward can still command a healthy price it helps increase ‘net dollars’. Expert 
picks are not applicable in the team-based fan analysis because team-based fans do not base their 
purchase of a forward on expert recommendations. Also, as stated earlier, portfolio variables are 
not applicable in the team-based fan analysis. 
If the objective of the game-based fans is only to minimize their costs, a regression model 
needs to be estimated – model II represents this case. The effects of the trade type variable is the 
same as in model I. There seems to be a negative effect of having many unique teams (linear 
portfolio breadth variable); this implies that having more teams increases the amount spent more 
than the amount obtained through resale. The quadratic portfolio breadth variable however is 
significant and positive – this implies that beyond a certain threshold  (approximately 9 unique 
teams) having more teams helps increase net dollars. To understand why this is the case I ran two 
separate regression models: one with the ‘total amount paid’ as the dependent variable and the 
other with the ‘total amount obtained through resale’ as the dependent variable. The results 
indicate that the quadratic portfolio breath variable decreases the total amount paid and increases 
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the total amount obtained through resale. This implies that beyond a certain threshold of unique 
teams fans buy and sell forwards more efficiently. In comparing the results of model II with that 
of model I it can be seen that selling early is non-significant in the game-based fan model (model 
II) whereas it is significant and helps in the team-based fan model (model I). Most team-based 
fans tend to hold onto their forwards longer; this implies that if their team does not make it to the 
final they lose out on recouping even the price they paid. Therefore selling early helps team-
based fans. The ‘rank deviation’ variable is insignificant in the game-based fan model (model II) 
while it is significant and helps in the team-based fan model (model I). Rank deviation helps 
because a small change in ranking (in either direction) increases bidder’s willingness-to-pay for 
the team. Since many transactions occur towards the end of the season, team-based fans (who 
resell) reap the benefits of the changes in ranking. Finally, pre-season picks are significant and 
help increase net dollars whereas mid-season picks are significant and hurt net dollars in the 
game-based fan model (model II). This is because while the amount that is obtained through 
resale is almost the same for both pre- and mid-season picks, the amount paid for pre-season 
picks tends to be significantly lower than that paid for mid-season picks.  
In model III (Table 13) the factors that affect the game-based fans’ probability of 
attending the game are presented. First off, selling early, pre-season picks and all conference 
variables other than SEC and PAC10 were automatically dropped because they predicted failure 
perfectly. Conferences SEC and PAC10 produced 3 of the 4 teams that made it to the Final Four 
in 2006 – LSU, UCLA and Florida (George Mason is in the ‘Colonial Athletic Association’ 
conference). This is the reason why only 353 observations are used in the estimation of the probit 
model. Clearly buying early decreases the game-based fans’ chances of attending the game. With 
team rankings changing every week, it is over time that there is more information on which 
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teams have a chance of making it through. Because one of the mid-season picks (Florida) made it 
to the Final Four, heeding experts mid-season picks helps game-based fans. So while mid-season 
picks hurt the game-based fan’s net dollars (mode II) they increase the fans chances of attending 
the game. A negative coefficient on the ‘rank deviation’ variable indicates that a bad 
performance in the short-term is typically associated with reducing the fans’ chances of attending 
the game. Further a risky portfolio also hurts game-based fans chances of attending the game.  
Model IV (Table 14) denotes the factors that affect the game-based fan’s dual objective 
of maximizing her chances of attending the game at a minimum cost. Recall that the fan prefers 
to be in rank 1; therefore a negative coefficient in model IV indicates that the variable helps the 
fan. First, and most important, we see that the coefficient of the linear portfolio breadth variable 
is statistically significant. This implies that having many unique teams helps the game-based 
fan’s chances of attending the game. However because the quadratic portfolio breadth variable is 
insignificant it is unclear whether the benefit of having unique teams reduces at some point.  
Buying early decreases the probability of attending the game (model III) and therefore 
hurts the rank variable as well (model IV). Selling early also hurts the fans’ chances of attending 
the game. Further, as a strategy, buying a team that is coming off a recent bad performance 
seems to hurt the fan (the coefficient of the ‘rank deviation’ variable is positive). It hurts the 
probability of attending the game (see model III). Expert picks (pre- and mid-season) hurt the 
game-based fan’s dual objective. In the probit model (model III) pre-season picks hurt and mid-
season picks help the game-based fan’s chances of attending the game. In the regression model 
(model II) pre-season picks hurt while mid-season picks help. When combining these effects in 
model V, it seems the negative effects of both pre- and mid-season picks prevail. The lambdas 
are the estimated cutoff points on the latent variable used to differentiate between the low and 
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high ranks. Subjects with a value of -5.69 or lower on the underlying latent variable that gave 
rise to the rank variable would be classified as rank 1 given the other variables are evaluated at 
zero. Similarly, subjects with values between -5.69 and -5.49 would be classified as rank 2, those 
with values between -5.49 and 0.602 would be classified as rank 3 and those with values higher 
than 0.602 would be classified as rank 4. 
Finally, we estimate the factors that affect both team- and game-based fans if they have 
the same dual objective (in model V – Table 14). In other words, if team-based fans also made a 
conscious decision to pick the right team and their choice was not driven by loyalties, this model 
would apply. Note though, that all the indications we have point to the fact that team-based fans 
do choose teams based on loyalties – for instance team-based fans don’t resell their team’s 
forward irrespective of the its performance. Therefore, model V is estimated for the sake of 
completeness. We contrast the results of the individual models with that of the combined model. 
In the game-based fan model (model IV), the linear portfolio breadth term is significant and 
reveals that diversifying the portfolio of game-based fans help. However in the combined model 
(model V) the effects of both the portfolio breadth variables (linear and quadratic) are 
insignificant. Therefore when combining the sample of team- and game-based fans the effects of 
portfolio diversification seems to get washed out. Further, the effect of the trade type variable is 
curious – it is insignificant in the game-based fan model while it hurts team-based fans. 
Combining these two samples however makes the trade type variable help in model V. Also, 
while selling early and a change in ranking (rank deviation) help team-based fans (model I), they 
hurt game-based fans (model IV). In the combined model, it seems like the effect of game-based 
fans supersedes that of team-based fans (it hurts in the combined model). Therefore assuming the 
same objective for the entire sample as done in model V helps clarify that the two groups of fans 
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are indeed different and that combing them either tilts the results in favor of the game-based fans 
(because they engage in the majority of the transactions) or the effects get washed out. This 
speaks to the importance of having different models to estimate different fan behaviors.  
3.5.2 Robustness check 
As a justification for estimating the regression, probit and the ordered logit models I consider an 
alternate specification. For all the previously estimated models I have assumed that each of the 
factors of the dual objective do not affect the other – in other words, the possibility of a 
simultaneous system has not been accounted for. It could however be argued that the fans’ 
probability of attending the game is a function of the amount spent for the ticket and vice versa. 
To rule out this possibility I estimate a simultaneous system using a standard two-stage 
estimation process. Because there is a binary and a continuous dependent variable, care must be 
taken in estimating the standard errors (Maddala 1983, pp 244-245). Fortunately, Keshk (2003) 
has recently developed a Stata program (CDSIMEQ procedure) that implements the two stage 
probit least squares (2SPLS) procedure and corrects the standard errors.  
 In the first stage, I regress the two dependent variables (‘net dollars’ and ‘attend game’) 
on a set of exogenous variables. In the second stage, the fitted variable for a given dependent 
variable is used as the exogenous variable for the other dependent variable. In particular, I use 
the first-stage regression to estimate net dollars*, the fitted value of the ‘net dollars’ variable. 
Then, in the second stage probit, it is analyzed whether net dollars* is significantly related to the 
‘attend game’ variable. To identify the simultaneous system I include the “units bid on” 
variable34. I estimated the simultaneous system with (a) the entire sample and (b) with individual 
                                                 
34
 Note that buying one forward as opposed to ten forwards (on a given team) influences the amount of money spent 
(and therefore the ‘net dollars’ variable) but does not increase the probability of attending the game. 
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models for the team- and game-based fans. The results of the CDSIMEQ procedure indicate that 
the system is not simultaneous.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter gives us a better understanding of the factors that affect fans’ decision-
making in ticket markets. Accounting for fan heterogeneity, I allow fans to have different 
objectives in this market and consequently estimate different models to understand their 
behaviors.  
An ordered logit model that parses out the effects of risk minimization and cost reduction 
is estimated for game-based fans; a regression model that identifies cost reduction strategies is 
estimated for team-based fans. The question of whether conventional wisdom on risk 
management from financial markets can be applied to consumer markets is addressed. Some of 
the results from the finance literature do carry through. Consistent with the idea of diversifying 
one’s portfolio in financial markets, it is demonstrated that it is a good strategy for fans to buy 
forwards of many unique teams (to increase their chances of attending the game). Further, using 
a short-term indicator of performance (seeing if the team performs better at the week of purchase 
compared to its performance in the previous week) as a strategy to ‘pick’ the right teams does 
not pay off for game-based fans; it does seem like a good strategy for team-based fans who want 
to decrease their out-of-pocket expenses. More long-term performance measures should be used 
to guide buying decisions. Interestingly, heeding expert forecasts does not seem to be a good 
strategy for game-based fans.  
 The sports market setting used was for various reasons. Firstly, in this context the two 
forces at play (maximizing the probability of attending the game while minimizing the cost) can 
be clearly seen. Further, given that it is known which teams made it to the final game in the 
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previous years I have the unique ability to classify fans’ transactions as being ‘good’ or ‘bad’. 
Consumers tend to have dual objectives (of maximizing their chance and minimizing their cost) 
in other environments with market-uncertainties as well. For instance, till recently, there was 
uncertainty regarding which format of DVD (HD or Blue ray) would emerge the winner. As of 
February 2008 Toshiba dropped out of the HD race leaving the market for Sony’s Blue ray partly 
because the fight between the two formats was keeping many consumers out of the market. 
According to a technology analyst “..consumers had held off investing in the latest recorders and 
players because they didn’t know which format would emerge dominant” (Kageyama 2008). In 
this market, before the uncertainty was resolved, consumers would have faced a similar dilemma 
- to pick the ‘right format’ to invest in while simultaneously seeking to minimize costs. Our 
methodology could be used to study the factors that would satisfy consumers’ dual objectives in 
such settings. 
There are many interesting directions for future research even in the sports market 
context. For example, it would be interesting to study the value of having similar teams in a 
portfolio. Finance literature suggests a low correlation among portfolio holdings can help. The is 
because when one of the investments does not perform well the rest of the portfolio can remain 
balanced. In the context of sports teams, similarity could, arguably, be a function of which 
conference the teams belong to.  It is unclear that in a highly volatile market that operates for less 
than twenty-two weeks in a year, the recommendation of a dissimilar portfolio would continue to 
hold. Another issue of interest is to study what causes the difference in the amount paid by 
‘successful’ fans (those who eventually attend the game). One could compare the effectiveness 
of strategies such as ‘buy and hold’ versus ‘buy and sell when team is not performing well’. 
While reselling a forward clearly helps the fan offset the total amount spent, given that there is a 
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tradeoff in not holding the ‘right’ team until the end, it is unclear which strategy will be 
preferred. Finally even though I used existing procedures to estimate the simultaneous models, a 
new procedure needs to be developed to be able to cluster standard errors in a system with a 
binary and a continuous dependent variable. Because clustering for standard errors cannot be 
properly accounted for in this setting it is recognized that the significance of some of the 
independent variables could be understated (Chaney et al 2007).
 CHAPTER 4: 
CONSUMER FORWARDS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
TO TOURNAMENT TICKET PRICING 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 1 option pricing was studied as a new pricing mechanism that could be implemented 
in markets with uncertainty. This chapter considers a different type of pricing mechanism – 
forward pricing - that can be implemented under the same conditions. Given that option pricing 
was a more profitable pricing mechanism that elicited positive reactions from fans, why is 
another new pricing mechanism required? Further how does option pricing (proposed in chapter 
1) compare with the newly proposed forward pricing mechanism? This chapter answers these 
questions. To begin with, the concept of forward pricing is introduced. Then, the differences 
between option pricing and forward pricing are highlighted. Fans’ willingness to pay (WTP) are 
elicited using a study. Finally a simple analytical model is formulated and conditions under 
which profitability of forward pricing is higher than those from the other pricing mechanisms are 
discussed. 
 Unlike an option, a forward ticket is bought for a specific team by paying the ‘forward 
price’. If that specific team makes it to the final game the fan is eligible to exercise the forward 
by paying the exercise price. If the team does not make it to the final game the forward expires 
and the fan loses the forward price. 
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Because the forward expires the fan does not need to pay the exercise price. With option pricing 
because the option is not tied to a particular team, fans who buy an option could choose to attend 
any game. With forwards however if fans seek to increase their chances of attending the game 
they should purchase multiple forwards to different teams. Another point of differentiation is that 
option pricing was used to price tickets in a local market where there was one preferred team. 
With forward pricing the league can set prices when there are many preferred teams. Therefore 
this chapter can be seen as an extension to the option pricing chapter (chapter 1). 
 This pricing mechanism has not yet been implemented by the league. One reason could 
be the possible negative fan perceptions of this practice. Leagues are sensitive to fan perceptions 
of their pricing practices partly because the league gets most of its revenues (directly through 
ticket sales, or indirectly through network broadcasting rights which are affected by fan 
viewership) from the fans. If the league had a hundred seats to sell to a game it could, 
theoretically, collect the forward price across all fans and the exercise price from those fans who 
make it to the final. The fact that leagues could profit from ‘reselling one ticket many times over’ 
could create some resentment among fans. But forward pricing has been implemented by some 
third-party firms which offer forwards on tickets to various tournament games. So this research 
could be viewed as an attempt to catch up with business practices. 
 Because the forward pricing concept is relatively new I begin with an exploration of fans’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for this type of ticket. From the open-ended feedback that was 
collected it can be seen that fans agree forward pricing would be valuable offering. I analyze an 
analytical model with two types of fans with different valuations for the final game and I 
demonstrate the conditions under which profits from forward pricing are higher than those from 
the other pricing mechanisms.  
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4.2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
I begin by exploring fans’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for tickets to the Final Four game 
under different levels of uncertainty in team matchups. Final Four tickets are used as our 
stimulus because of its relevance to the student population. Using a computer study I ascertain 
students’ willingness to pay for a ticket to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
Final Four men’s basketball game (hereafter ‘the final game’) at two college campuses. I conduct 
the study at the student union buildings of two large public universities in the south. At each 
campus I obtain students WTP for tickets to the final game under different probabilities that their 
college will make it to the game. To elicit more accurate WTP measures students at both 
campuses were offered the opportunity to enter a drawing to buy a real ticket to the 
championship game  based on their stated WTP for the ticket. Participants were informed that if 
their name was drawn they would be required to buy the ticket by paying the average price they 
had indicated in the study. The winner of the ticket paid us $200 for an upper-level ticket to the 
2007 Championship game at the RCA Dome in Indianapolis.  
4.2.1 Method 
Twenty-five undergraduate students were recruited from each of the two college campuses to 
participate in a 20-minute within-subject computer study in return for $5 cash. At the beginning 
of the study participants were asked to indicate their favorite team – over 90% of the respondents 
listed their home university as their favorite team. Subsequent questions were automatically 
adjusted so that they were pertinent to that particular team. To be eligible for inclusion in our 
study students had to answer a set of ‘test your understanding’ questions correctly. This indicated 
that they understood the forward pricing concept. Four students did not pass the test and our 
sample is comprised of forty six students (twenty three from each campus).  
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Fans indicated their WTP under three pricing conditions (1) advance selling (2) forward 
pricing and (3) full information pricing. In the advance selling condition, subjects indicated their 
willingness to pay for a “regular ticket” given three different probabilities (25%, 50%, and 75%) 
of their favorite team making it through the tournament. In the forward pricing condition, based 
on extensive pre-testing, the levels of the forward price ( FP ) were fixed at $20, $40 and $60. 
Given a certain forward price, subjects then indicated their willingness to pay for the “exercise 
price” ( GP )35. In the full information condition, subjects indicated their willingness to pay for the 
ticket once they knew whether or not their favorite team made it to the Final Four (0% or 100%). 
Across the pricing conditions the fans were offered the same broad range of prices to choose 
from ($0 to $400 in increments of $20). Fans had the choice of not buying a ticket under all 
pricing conditions – they could simply indicate a WTP of $0. Because this is a within-subject 
design, the presentation order of tickets was counterbalanced in order to control for possible 
order effects. No significant order effects were found; therefore this factor is ignored in the 
remainder of the chapter.  
To better understand what fans thought about the concept of forward pricing I obtained 
some open-ended feedback from respondents. Finally, because I wanted to understand the 
behavioral determinants of consumer willingness to pay under various pricing approaches, I 
follow Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) and measure fans’ risk preferences based on their 
                                                 
35
 We do not allow fans to choose both the forward and the exercise price because we want to obtain their WTP 
without confounding our measures with individual differences in risk preferences. For example, suppose we allow 
subjects to state their willingness to pay for both the forward and the exercise price, and one subject was willing to 
pay a forward price of $50 and an exercise price of $100 given a 0.25 probability of her favorite team making it to 
the big game. Suppose another subject was willing to pay $25 for the forward price and $100 as the exercise price 
given a 0.50 probability of her favorite team making it through the tournament. In this case, the expected value of 
both subjects’ willingness to pay is the same ($75). However, it can be argued that the first fan who was willing to 
pay more for the forward when there was a lower probability of the team playing in the final game is more risk-
averse than the latter.  
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responses to a lottery question (fans who are willing to pay less for the lottery than its expected 
value are considered to be risk-averse; these fans represent 83% of the sample). 
4.2.2 Results 
Overall, the majority ( 57%) of the respondents thought that this pricing mechanism would 
succeed and that they would buy a forward ticket if offered. For example one respondent 
commented: “The forward ticket concept relieves a lot of the stress that comes with buying a 
ticket for a game.  A person buys it ahead of time with the chance that their team will go to the 
championships.  This way if they don't, they don't have to deal with the stress of reselling the 
tickets.  I would buy it”. Another one said he liked the concept because “it would mean more 
fans of whichever team was playing present, and I would rather have that than people who attend 
because their company got them tickets.”  
 About 33% of the sample were fans who were WTP zero to attend a game in which their 
favorite team was NOT playing – these fans are labeled as team-based fans. Other fans with 
positive valuations for any game are labeled as game-based fans.  Further a greater proportion of 
team-based fans are generally more risk averse compared to the game-based fans. Thus team-
based fans are more risk-averse (t=3.23, p<0.001) and they have zero-valuation for the non-
preferred game.  
 The average expected valuations of the team-based and game-based fans can be 
calculated for the various uncertainty levels using the stated WTP for the preferred and non-
preferred game under full information. Table 15 reports these expected valuations for three 
probability levels (0.25, 0.50 and 0.75). I find that game-based fans’ expected valuation for the 
game is always significantly higher than the team-based fans’ expected valuation.  
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Table 15: Fans expected valuation under different uncertainty levels 
Probability Game-Based Fan Team-Based fan t-value 
0.25γ =  $121.61 $31.33 5.307 
0.50γ =  $146.45 $62.67 4.352 
0.75γ =  $171.29 $94.00 3.389 
 
The main effect of pricing is significant (F = 4.50, p<0.015). This implies that fans are 
WTP differently under the different pricing mechanisms. The interaction between pricing and 
risk aversion is not significant with forward pricing36. With forward pricing because forwards 
expire if the specific team does not make it to the final game, fans are WTP lesser for it than 
other pricing mechanisms irrespective of risk aversion. Therefore while risk averse fans are more 
WTP for forward pricing than less risk averse fans, they are NOT WTP more for forward pricing 
than the other pricing mechanisms.  
From the willingness to pay information, the demand (at various prices), was calculated. I 
then compute profits at the various prices and use the price that yields the highest profit as the 
optimal price under each pricing approach. I calculate the profitability of the different pricing 
mechanisms under three different probabilities (0.25, 0.50 and 0.75) of each team making it to 
the final game. The grouping of the probabilities of profits in all possible scenarios is given in 
the table below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 With option pricing the interaction between  risk aversion and pricing was significant. This is because fans are 
WTP more for option pricing (than for any other pricing mechanism) if they are risk averse.  
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Table 16: Scenarios Used in Profit Computation 
Combination Probability of Team A making 
it to the Final Four ( )Aγ  
Probability of Team B making 
it to the Final Four ( )Bγ  
1 0.25 0.25 
2 0.25 0.50 
3 0.50 0.25 
4 0.50 0.75 
5 0.75 0.50 
6 0.75 0.75 
7 0.25 0.75 
8 0.50 0.50 
9 0.75 0.25 
 
In combinations 1 through 6 independent of the probability of team A making it ( )Aγ , 
team B can have a high or low probability of making it.  However combinations 7 through 9 
represent the cases where there could be correlation between the probabilities of teams A and B 
(i.e., Aγ  and Bγ ). For example, in the extreme case of 0Aγ = , Bγ  has a high probability of 
playing in the final game. This concept is captured by combinations 7, 8 and 9 – when Aγ  is low 
Bγ  is high and vice versa. 
Profits from all pricing mechanisms under the nine combinations are depicted in Figure 1. 
From Figure 1, as would be expected, we see that profits from full information pricing are 
always higher than those from advance selling. In combinations 7, 8 and 9 profits from forward 
pricing exceed those from full information pricing. These are the combinations in which there is 
a direct correlation between team A’s chance and team B’s chances of making it to the final 
game  (i.e., if team A had a 25% chance of making it to the game, team B has a 75% chance). 
Therefore the value of full information is lower in these combinations. In combinations 2 
through 6 profits from full information are higher than those from forwards. In combination 1 the 
probability of both teams making it to the Final game is really low ( 0.25, 0.25A Bγ γ= = ). In this 
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case profits from forward pricing exceed that from full information pricing. Therefore 
uncertainty helps forward pricing.  
To summarize, if the probability of both teams making it is low (Case 1)  or if the 
probabilities are correlated (Cases 7 through 9) profits from forward pricing exceed those from 
full information pricing. For the other combinations profits from full information pricing exceed 
those from forward pricing. Across the combinations profit from forward pricing and full 
information pricing are always higher than that from advance selling (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Profitability Across Pricing Conditions 
 
 
 
4.3 MODEL 
In this section I consider a stylized individual-level model to study the conditions under which 
forward pricing is more profitable than the other pricing mechanisms.  As stated earlier, unlike 
option pricing, forward pricing can be studied when there is more than one preferred team in the 
market. Therefore I study the case where three teams (A, B and C) compete amongst themselves 
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and two (of the three teams) make it to the final game. The three team case is the simplest way to 
capture the case of multiple teams with different probabilities of making it to the final.  
An example of when three teams compete amongst each other and two (of the three) 
reach the final game is the Wildcard weekend in professional football games (NFL). The lower 
ranked teams play amongst themselves; the winner plays with the top-ranked team.  To clarify 
the case that is being considered Figure 12 is presented. 
 
Figure 12: Three Teams Competing To Reach the Final Game 
 
         
(A, B) play in the final
(B, C) play in the final
(A, C) play in the final
Team A
Team B
Team C
t=1 t=2
 
 
At time 1 (t=1) three teams (A, B and C) are competing to reach the final game. This is 
when forward tickets and advance selling tickets are sold. At time 2 it is known which of the 
team combinations will be playing in the final game. This is when tickets are sold under full 
information pricing. I begin the analysis with a simplification: I consider only one of the three 
possible final matchups (that of team A and team B playing in the final). I later extend the 
analysis by allowing for the other possibilities as well.  
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I consider two types of fans: game- and team-based. Teams A and B have their own team 
and game-based fans. Team A’s team-based fans have zero utility for team B (and vice versa). 
Game-based fans on the other hand have positive utility for both team A and team B.  The utility 
of Team A’s team-based fan is represented by TAU  and that of team B’s team-based fan is 
represented by TBU .  The utility of the game-based fan for team A is represented by GAU  (and that 
of team B is represented by GBU ). When the data that was collected from the two colleges was 
combined I find two different types of game-based fans in the market – some with GA GBU U>  
and others with GB GAU U> . Therefore four different fans are considered (two team-based fans 
and two types of game-based fans). Empirically, on average, GB GA TA TBU U U U> > > . Therefore 
this is the ordering that is analyzed. The probability with which a given team i makes it to the 
final game is given by iγ
37
. I define the forward and exercise prices to be FP  and GP  
respectively. The advance selling price is given by AP ; the full information price when teams A 
and B make it to the final game is given by ( )F ABP . Because team-based fans have no utility in 
watching any team except their favorite one play, we assume they buy a single forward (to the 
team of their choice). Game-based fans can buy multiple forwards to increase their chances of 
attending the game.  
In the remainder of this section, I focus on the situation in which the league sets ticket 
prices so that all fans participate.  I have ensured that, under certain conditions, it is indeed 
optimal for the league to serve all fans under all three pricing mechanisms. I compute the 
profitability across forward pricing, advance selling and full information pricing. 
 
                                                 
37
 Substituting 1A Bγ γ= − ensures that the probabilities of team A and B are correlated and it does not change any 
of the results.  
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4.3.1 Case I: Teams A and B can make it to the final game 
Utility Ordering: GB GA TA TBU U U U> > >  
Forward Pricing: 
With forward pricing, a fan pays the forward price ( FP ) at time 1 and the exercise price ( GP ) 
once the final outcome is known (at time 2). The league sets both the forward and exercise prices 
at time 1. The league can extract the surplus from either the game- or the team-based fans. I 
begin by ensuring the individual rationality constraint of both team-based fans hold (in Sub case 
A). I later check to see if this is optimal. 
Sub case A: 
Setting the individual rationality constraint of both team-based fans results in the 
equations below: 
0F A G A TAP P Uγ γ+ − =           (38) 
0F B G B TBP P Uγ γ+ − =           (39) 
Solving eqns. (38) and (39) gives the optimal forward and exercise price: 
( ) ( )F A B TB TA A BP U Uγ γ γ γ= − −           (40) 
( ) ( )G TA A TB B A BP U Uγ γ γ γ= − −           (41) 
From the optimal forward price it is easy to see that it is decreasing with respect to Bγ . Therefore 
as the probability of team B making it to the final decreases the league charges a low forward 
price from team B’s team-based fan. This ensures her participation. However as the probability 
of team A making it ( Aγ ) increases, the forward price increases. This is because the utility of 
team A’s team-based fan is higher than that of team B’s team-based fan (i.e., TA TBU U> ) – 
therefore she has enough reason to participate as it is. For the optimal forward price to be 
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positive the probability of team A making it should be lower than that of team B (i.e., A Bγ γ< ). 
For the optimal exercise price to be positive, given that A Bγ γ< ,  the expected utility of team A’s 
team-based fan should be lower than that of team B’s team-based fan (i.e., TA A TB BU Uγ γ< ).  
The game-based fan could engage in one of the following strategies: (a) she could buy 
team A’s forward (b) she could buy team B’s forward or (c) she could buy both A and B’s 
forwards and exercise either (depending on which of these occur). She chooses the strategy that 
gives her the highest surplus. Because the entire surplus is extracted from the team-based fans 
(see eqns. (38) and (39)), the game-based fan receives a surplus of ( )A GA TAU Uγ − if she chooses 
to buy only team A’s forward, a surplus of ( )B GB TBU Uγ −  if she buys only team B’s forward and  
( ) ( )A GA TA B GB TBU U U Uγ γ− + − if she buys both forwards. Because buying both forwards gives 
her the highest surplus she buys both teams’ forwards, paying an expected price of 
2 ( )F A B GP Pγ γ+ + .  
Profits from forward pricing ( Fπ ) are obtained from the two types of game-based fans 
and the two team-based fans. They are given by: 
2(2 ( ) )F F A B G F A G F B GP P P P P Pπ γ γ γ γ= + + + + + +         (42) 
Substituting the optimal prices from eqns. (40) and (41), gives the optimal profits: 
3( )F A TA B TBU Uπ γ γ= +           (43) 
Advance Selling: 
As stated earlier, TA A TB BU Uγ γ<  ensures that the exercise price is positive. Given this ordering of 
expected utility the advance selling price is set at TA AU γ   (i.e., A TA AP U γ= ) to ensure all four fans 
participate. Therefore profits ( Aπ ) are given by: 
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4A A TAUπ γ=            (44) 
Full Information Pricing: 
In this type of pricing, the league sets the ticket price after it knows which teams are playing in 
the final game. Therefore, given that teams A and B are playing the league sets the price at TBU  
(i.e., ( )F AB TBP U= ) such that all fans (both types of game-based fans and the two team-based 
fans) will attend the game. Therefore expected full information profits ( FIπ ) are given by: 
4FI B TBUπ γ=            (45) 
Comparing Profits Across Pricing Mechanisms: 
Given that TA A TB BU Uγ γ< , the difference between the profits in the full information case 
(eqn. (45)) and advance selling (eqn. (44)) is positive.  Further, the difference in profits between 
forward pricing and advance selling (eqns. (43) and (45)) which is given below, is also positive: 
3F A B TB A TAU Uπ π γ γ− = −          (46) 
Given that the league sets both the advance selling price and the price under forward pricing at 
time 1 it can always set the forward price equal to the advance selling price (and the exercise 
price to be zero). Therefore it is intuitive that forward pricing can do no worse than advance 
selling. As Bγ  increases profits from forward pricing increase more than they do with advance 
selling. This is because the B TBUγ  term plays a bigger role in forward profits than does A TAUγ  (as 
stated earlier for the exercise price to be positive A TAUγ  should be less than B TBUγ ).  
The difference in profits between forward pricing and full information pricing (eqns. (43) 
and (45)) is given by: 
3( ) 4F FI A TA B TB B TBU U Uπ π γ γ γ− = + −          (47) 
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Profits from forward pricing can exceed those from full information pricing if 
3 .A TA B TBU Uγ γ>   Therefore, if the expected utility of team A’s team-based fan is high enough, the 
profit ordering in Case 1 is given by: 
F FI Aπ π π> >            (48) 
 Profits from forward pricing were computed when the individual rationality of the team-
based fans were satisfied. It remains to be shown that this is indeed optimal. Next, the 
profitability from forward pricing when the individual rationality constraints of a game-based 
fan and a team-based fan are satisfied is computed in Sub case B. 
Sub case B: 
Setting the individual rationality constraint of team A’s team-based fan and a game-based 
fan results in the equations below: 
0F A G A TAP P Uγ γ+ − =           (49) 
2 ( ) ( ) 0F A B G A GA B GBP P U Uγ γ γ γ+ + − + =          (50) 
As shown in the earlier section (Sub case A), given the utility ordering in the current case 
( GB GA TA TBU U U U> > > ) game-based fans buy both forwards. Solving eqns. (38) and (39), the 
optimal forward and exercise prices are obtained: 
( ( )) ( )F A A GA B GB TA A B A BP U U Uγ γ γ γ γ γ γ= + − + −        (51) 
(2 ( )) ( )G TA A GA A GB B A BP U U Uγ γ γ γ γ= − + −         (52) 
Given these optimal prices the league needs to ensure the participation of the other team-
based fan. Team B’s team-based fan participates if the price she pays is less than her expected 
utility i.e., if F B G B TBP P Uγ γ+ < . Substituting the optimal prices the inequality reduces to 
A GA B GB A TA B TBU U U Uγ γ γ γ+ < + . This is never true given the current utility ordering. This implies 
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that team B’s team-based fan never participates if the prices are set such that the game-based fan 
and team A’s team-based fan’s individual rationality constraints are satisfied. 
Finally, what if the individual rationality constraint of one game-based fan and team B’s 
team-based fan is satisfied? This scenario is considered in Sub case C. 
Sub case C: 
The two individual rationality constraints that would need to be solved are: 
0F B G B TBP P Uγ γ+ − =           (53) 
2 ( ) ( ) 0F A B G A GA B GBP P U Uγ γ γ γ+ + − + =          (54) 
Solving eqns. (53) and (54) the optimal forward and exercise prices are obtained: 
( ( ) ( )) ( )F B TB A B A GA B GB A BP U U Uγ γ γ γ γ γ γ= + − + −         (55) 
(( ) 2 ) ( )G GA A GB B TB B A BP U U Uγ γ γ γ γ= + − −          (56) 
Given these optimal prices the league needs to ensure the participation of the other team-
based fan. Team A’s team-based fan participates if the price she pays is less than her expected 
utility i.e., if F A G A TAP P Uγ γ+ < . Substituting the optimal prices the inequality reduces to 
A GA B GB A TA B TBU U U Uγ γ γ γ+ < + . Again, this is never true given the current utility ordering. This 
implies that team A’s team-based fan never participates if the prices are set such that the game-
based fan and team B’s team-based fan’s individual rationality constraints are satisfied. 
Therefore it is optimal for the league to extract the surplus of both the team-based fans as done in 
Sub case A.  
When considering two teams’ making it to the final (A and B) we see that profits from 
forward pricing always exceeds that from advance selling and under some conditions it can 
exceed profits from full information pricing as well. Specifically, if the estimated probability of a 
team A making it to the final is low the required condition for the profitability of forward pricing 
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over full information pricing is that the expected utility of A’s team-based fan should be high. In 
the next section I extend the analysis to include all three combinations in Figure 2.  
 
4.3.2 Case II: Multiple Team Combinations 
I compute the profitability of forward pricing, advance selling and full information 
pricing when three teams compete and any two make it past the tournament to the final game. In 
other words, given that there are three teams, there are three combinations with which two teams 
can play in the final game (i.e., when A, B and C are competing to reach the final any 
combination of (A, B), (B, C) or (A, C) could end up playing at the final game).  
Because there are multiple combinations probabilities are assigned to each of these 
combinations: 1γ is the probability with which teams A and B will play in the final, 2γ is the 
probability with which teams B and C will play in the final and 1 21 γ γ− − is the probability with 
which teams A and C will play in the final. Therefore the probability with which team A will 
play in the final game is 1 1 2 21 1γ γ γ γ+ − − = − , team B will play in the final is 1 2γ γ+ and team C 
will play in the final is 2 1 2 11 1γ γ γ γ+ − − = − .  
Team-based fans utilities for teams A, B and C are TAU , TBU  and TCU  respectively. As a 
simplification I assume there is one type of game-based fan having the same utility for all three 
teams (i.e., GA GB GC GU U U U= = = ).  
I consider the ordering given below. Just as in the previous case I believe the utility of the 
game-based fans across the three teams will, on average, be greater than that of the team-based 
fans.  
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Utility Ordering: G TA TB TCU U U U> > >  
As done previously, I begin the analysis by ensuring the individual rationality of team A and 
team B’s team-based fans.  
Forward Pricing: 
Setting the individual rationality constraint of team A and team B’s team-based fans results in 
the equations below: 
2 2(1 ) (1 ) 0F G TAP P Uγ γ+ − − − =           (57) 
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) 0F G TBP P Uγ γ γ γ+ + − + =          (58) 
Solving eqns. (57) and (58) the optimal forward and exercise price are obtained: 
2 1 2 1 2(1 )( ) ( ) ( 2 1)F TA TBP U Uγ γ γ γ γ= − + − + −          (59) 
1 2 2 1 2( ) (1 ) ( 2 1)G TB TAP U Uγ γ γ γ γ= + − − + −          (60) 
From the optimal forward price it is easy to see that it is decreasing as the probability with which 
team B makes it to the final increases (i.e., as 1 2( )γ γ+  increases). Therefore as the probability 
with which team B making it to the final decreases the league charges a low forward price from 
team B’s team-based fan. This ensures her participation. However, as the probability of team A 
making it ( 2(1 )γ− ) increases the forward price increases. This is because the utility of team A’s 
team-based fan is sufficiently high to ensure her participation ( TA TBU U> ).  Further, as the 
probability of (A, B) making it to the final increases (i.e., as 1γ  increases) the forward price, 
which is also collected from the team-based fans of team C, decreases. But the exercise price 
increases as the probability of the (A, B) combination making it increases ( 1γ ) because team C’s 
team-based fan will not participate anyway. 
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For the optimal forward price to be positive it is required that 1 22 1 0γ γ+ − > . Further, for 
the optimal exercise price to be positive, given that 1 22 1 0γ γ+ − > , the expected utility of team 
A’s team-based fan should be lesser than that of team B’s team-based fan (i.e., 
2 1 2(1 ) ( )TA TBU Uγ γ γ− < + ).  
Given that the optimal prices have been set, I check whether team C’s team-based fan 
will participate. She will participate if the expected price she pays is lower than her expected 
utility. In other words she will participate if 1 1(1 ) (1 )F G TCP P Uγ γ+ − < − . This condition will be 
satisfied if the utility of the team-based fan is high enough, as given below: 
2 2
2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1(1 )(2 1) ( ) ( 2 1)(1 )TC TA TBU U Uγ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ> − + − + − + − −     (61) 
The game-based fan could do one of the following things: (a) she could buy team A’s 
forward (b) team B’s forward (c) team C’s forward or (d) she could buy all teams to ensure she 
gets to attend any game. She chooses the strategy that gives her the most surplus. Given that A 
and B’s team-based fan’s surplus have been completely extracted, if she buys team A’s forward 
she gets a surplus of 2(1 )( )G TAU Uγ− − ; if she buys team B’s forward she gets a surplus of 
1 2( )( )G TBU Uγ γ+ − . Also, given that team C’s team-based fan participates this implies that the 
game-based fan gets a surplus when she buys only team C’s forward as well (because 
)G TCU U> .  Therefore she gets the highest surplus when she buys and exercises all three teams’ 
forwards thereby paying 3 F GP P+ .  
Profits from forward pricing ( Fπ ) are collected from one game-based fan and three team-
based fans. They are given by: 
3F F G F A G F B G F C GP P P P P P P Pπ γ γ γ= + + + + + + +         (62) 
Substituting the optimal prices from eqns. (59) and (60), the optimal profits are obtained: 
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2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2(1 )(2 2 1) (1 2 )( ) ( 2 1)F TA TBU Uπ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ= − + − − − + + −       (63) 
Advance Selling: 
In the forward pricing case the expected utility of team A’s team-based fan should be lower than 
that of team B’s team-based fan (i.e., 2 1 2(1 ) ( )TA TBU Uγ γ γ− < + ) for the optimal exercise price to 
be positive. If the expected utility of team A’s team-based fan is also lower than that of team C 
(i.e., if 2 1(1 ) (1 )TA TCU Uγ γ− < −  then the advance price will be set at 2(1 )TAU γ−  to ensure that all 
fans participate. First, I check if 2 1(1 ) (1 )TA TCU Uγ γ− < − .  
Eqn. (61) gives us the condition that will ensure the participation of team C’s team-based 
fan. If 2 22 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1(1 ) (1 )(2 1) ( ) ( 2 1)(1 )TA TA TBU U Uγ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ− < − + − + − + − − , (the rhs of eqn. 
(61)), then it implies that 1 2(1 ) (1 )TC TAU Uγ γ− > − . Is 
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1(1 )( 2 1)(1 ) (1 )(2 1) ( )TA TA TBU U Uγ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ− + − − < − + − + − ? Rearranging the terms 
and multiplying through reduces the inequality to 2 1 2(1 ) ( )TA TBU Uγ γ γ− < + . This inequality is 
satisfied (from the forward pricing case this inequality ensures the exercise price is positive). 
Therefore 2 1(1 ) (1 )TA TCU Uγ γ− < −  and the advance selling price is set equal to 2(1 )TAU γ− . 
Profits from advance selling are obtained from three team-based fans and one game-based fan. 
They are given by: 
24(1 )A TAUπ γ= −          (64) 
Full Information Pricing: 
The league sets the price after knowing which of the team combinations will be playing in the 
final game. Depending on the teams that make it to the final the respective teams’ team-based 
fans will attend the game. The game-based fan will attend any final game. If (A, B) make it to 
the final game the league sets the price at TBU  such that one game-based fan and two team-based 
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fans (of A and B) attend the game. However, if either (A, C) or (B,C) occurs then the league sets 
the price equal to TCU  to ensure that all three fans in question will participate. Therefore expected 
full information profits ( FIπ ) are given by: 
1 13( (1 ) )FI TB TCU Uπ γ γ= + −          (65) 
Comparing Profits Across the Pricing Mechanisms: 
The difference between the profits in the forward pricing case (eqn.(63)) and advance selling 
(eqn.(64)) is given by: 
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2((1 ) (1 2 2 ) 3(2 1)( ) ) ( 2 1)F A TA TBU Uπ π γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ− = − + − + − + + −       (66) 
The denominator is positive (this ensures that the forward price is positive). Therefore if 
the numerator is positive then forward profits are higher than those from advance selling. In 
other words, after rearranging the terms, the condition that is required for the numerator to be 
positive is given below: 
2 2 1 2 2 1(1 ) 3(2 1)( ) (2 2 1)TA TBU Uγ γ γ γ γ γ− < − + − −        (67) 
For the exercise price to be positive 2 1 2(1 ) ( )TA TBU Uγ γ γ− < + .  Therefore if 
2 1 2 1 2 1 23(2 1)( ) ( 1 2 2 ) ( )TB TBU Uγ γ γ γ γ γ γ− + − − + > + then 2 1 2(1 ) ( )TA TBU Uγ γ γ− < +  implies that 
the condition in eqn. (67) holds true. Is 2 1 2 1 2 1 23(2 1)( ) ( 1 2 2 ) ( )TB TBU Uγ γ γ γ γ γ γ− + − − + > + ? 
Rearranging the terms and cross multiplying results in the inequality above reducing to the 
question of whether 1 22 1 0γ γ+ − >  which is known to be true (this is the required condition for 
the forward price to be positive). Therefore, because the condition in eqn. (67) is satisfied profits 
from forward pricing exceed those from advance selling. 
Next, profits from full information pricing and advance selling are compared. The 
difference in profits is given by: 
107 
 
2 1 14(1 ) 3( (1 ))A FI TA TB TCU U Uπ π γ γ γ− = − − + −          (68) 
Profits from advance selling exceed those from full information pricing if the condition 
below holds: 
2 1 1
3(1 ) ( (1 ) )
4TA TB TC
U U Uγ γ γ− > + −          (69) 
It has already been demonstrated that profits from forward pricing are greater than those from 
advance selling. Therefore profits from forward pricing exceed those from full information 
pricing when the condition in eqn. (69) is satisfied.  
 Comparing the conditions under which forward pricing is more profitable than full 
information pricing we see that in Case 1, (under the same ordering ( GB GA TA TBU U U U> > > ) ) 
profits from forward pricing could exceed those from full information pricing provided the 
expected utility of team A’s team-based fan was high enough (i.e., when 3A TA B TBU Uγ γ> ). The 
intuition behind this is as follows. Forward pricing is more profitable when there is uncertainty in 
the market place. A required condition for the prices to be positive in both cases is that the 
probability of team A making it to the final game is lower than that of team B (i.e., A Bγ γ< ). 
Therefore the expected utility of team A’s team-based fan should be high such that it 
compensates for the lower probability with which team A makes it to the final game. This 
ensures that team A’s team-based fan is valuable enough to be served.   
The reason that profitability from forward pricing can be higher than that from full 
information pricing is because forward pricing is able to extract the surplus from team-based fans 
of teams A and B while ensuring that the other fans participate. With full information however 
the best the league can do is it can extract TBU  when it ensures all fans participate. So how is 
forward pricing able to get team C’s team-based fan to participate? By lowering the forward 
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price sufficiently when the probability of team C making it is low (and extracting more using the 
exercise price that is paid later).  
 Again, to ensure that extracting the surplus of one team-based fan and one game-based 
fan is optimal I calculate the optimal profits from satisfying the individual rationality constraint 
of the game-based fan and any team-based fan. It results in one of the team-based fans not 
participating. Therefore, similar to Case I, it is most optimal for the league to extract the surplus 
from both team-based fans in Case II.  
Across the cases profits from forward pricing exceed those from advance selling. This is 
validated empirically as well. This is interesting because a forward ticket is a ‘lesser’ ticket than 
an advance ticket – when a fan buys an advance ticket she can choose to attend any game she 
wants. With a forward ticket however, a fan can ONLY attend the game if the team associated 
with the forward makes it to the final. Therefore the fact that fans prefer this kind of pricing 
mechanism because it protects them from having to resell the ticket demonstrates that there are 
indeed fans who have a valuation of zero for the non-preferred game. This is  demonstrated 
empirically as well.  
 
4.3.3 Comparing Profits Across Option and Forward Pricing Mechanisms: 
If the market is composed entirely of team-based fans, then forward pricing will be just as 
profitable as option pricing. These fans will not exercise either the option or the forward if their 
favorite team does not play in the final game. If, however, the market is composed of both game- 
and team-based fans, then the profitability of forward versus option pricing depends on the utility 
of the game-based fans. With option pricing a game-based fan who buys an option can use it at 
no extra charge irrespective of whether or not a given team makes it to the final. With forward 
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pricing however, given that forwards expire, game-based fans could buy multiple forwards if 
they would like to maximize their chances of attending the game. If the game-based fan gets 
higher surplus from buying multiple forwards (as is the case given the current utility ordering), 
the league gets multiple forward prices from the game-based fan which it would not under option 
pricing. This would result in higher profitability for the league.  
However, if the utility of the game-based fan is lower, because the game-based fan has to 
pay the additional forward price for every team she buys, her optimal strategy could change from 
buying multiple forwards to buying any one team’s forward. This implies her behavior would be 
similar to that of the team-based fan’s behavior. In this case profits from option pricing could be 
higher. This is because game-based fans value an option more than they value a forward (which 
is a ‘lesser’ product). Therefore, if the market is composed of both team- and game-based fans, 
the profitability of option pricing over forward pricing depends on the utility of the game-based 
fans. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
A mechanism to manage uncertainty in markets where purchase is separated from consumption 
is proposed. This type of pricing is applicable when there are heterogeneous consumers with 
different valuations for the outcomes and there are many preferred outcomes. With option 
pricing (proposed in chapter 1) fans had the same preferred team within the local market. 
Forward pricing can be used, for example, when in a given market there is more than one 
preferred team. I analytically model the forward pricing methodology and compare it with some 
other, more traditional, pricing methodologies. Profits from forward pricing can exceed those 
from expected full information profits. They always exceed those from advance selling. The 
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profitability of forward pricing is empirically verified using a study conducted on two college 
campuses. I obtain fans willingness-to-pay for tickets under different probabilities of their 
favorite team making it to the final game. Then, the profitability across different pricing 
mechanisms (full information, advance selling, forward pricing) is computed at different 
probabilities of the two teams making it to the final game. Profits from full information pricing 
are lower than those from forward pricing when the probability of both teams making it to the 
final game is really low or when the probabilities are correlated. Further profits from forward 
pricing always exceed those from advance selling.  
Though the concept of forward pricing is relatively new to the marketing academic literature, 
some third-party firms (such as firstdibz.com, yoonew.com) have already implemented this type 
of pricing. This work can be seen as an attempt to catch up with practice.  
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APPENDIX 
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS MODEL 
We restrict our analysis to the case where the league serves both segments and all game-based 
fans watch either game (Case B). In this region, profits under option pricing exceed those under 
other pricing mechanisms. We examine whether this finding continues to hold in the presence of 
capacity constraints. Let the capacity of the stadium be C.  
Advance Selling 
Similar to the derivations in the aggregate demand model in chapter 2, we obtain the quantity 
demanded by game- and team-based fans using a standard vertical differentiation model:  
1 2 1 2( ( (1 ) ))G G G G G Gq Pα β β β γ β γ= − − + ;   1( )T T Tq Pα β γ= −         ( 70) 
The demand is constrained by the available capacity, C:  
G TC q q= +          ( 71) 
We find the price that the league can charge, given that the capacity constraint (C) is binding.  
1 1 2 1 2( ) ( ( (1 ) ))G T T G G G GP P Cα α β γ β β β γ β γ+ − − − + =           ( 72) 
Solving for the price that satisfies the capacity yields, 
1 2 1 1 1 1 2( ) ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) ( ) )CAB G T G G G T G T GP Cα α γ β γ β γ β β γ β β β γ= + − − + − + +   ( 73) 
By comparing the price in the capacity constraint case with the price in the unconstrained 
capacity case (eqn. ( 73) and the price from Table 4) we see that the price is higher in the 
capacity constrained case if the following condition holds: 
( ) 2CAB G TP Pif C α α> < +             ( 74) 
From Table 4 note that the total quantity served in the advance selling case ( G Tq q+ ) equals 
( ) 2.G Tα α+  Therefore, when the capacity constraint binds (i.e., when ( ) 2G TC α α< + ) price 
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under capacity constraints is greater than the unconstrained price. Substituting the price into the 
profit function  ( C CAB ABP Cπ = ) yields the expression for profits under advance selling under a 
capacity constraint: 
1 2 1 1 1 1 2( ) ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) ( ) )CAB G T G G G T G T GC Cπ α α γ β γ β γ β β γ β β β γ= + − − + − + +             ( 75) 
Pricing an option ticket 
Case B: 
Similar to the derivations in the aggregate demand model in chapter 2, we obtain the quantity 
demanded by game- and team-based fans using a standard vertical differentiation model:  
1 2 2 1( ( )) ( (1 ) )B B BGE G G G O G G Gq P Pα β β γβ γ β= − + + − ;  1( )( )B B BTO T T O Gq P Pα β γ γ= − +          
( 76) 
Solving for the option and exercise price simultaneously yields: 
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2( ( ) ( (1 ) )) (1 )C B BO T G G GE G G GE G T G G T G GP q qγ α β β β β α β β γ β γ β β β γ= − + − − + −
     
( 77) 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2( ( ) ( )( ) ) ( ) (1 )C B B BG TO T G G GE G G G T GE G G T T G GP q q qγ α β β α β β β γ α β β β β β γ= − − − − − − −    ( 78) 
Under option pricing, the league can determine the optimal number of seats to serve to each fan 
segment through the price it sets. Said differently, we assume that the league serves Cδ  game-
based fans and (1 )Cδ− team-based fans, where the optimal number of game-based fans (δ )  is 
determined by the league.  Option profits are given by:  
( ) (1 ) ( ).C C C C COB O G O GC P P C P Pπ δ δ γ= + + − +     ( 79) 
Substituting BGEq Cδ= and (1 )BTOq Cδ= − into eqn. ( 79) and solving for the optimal fraction of 
game-based fans, δ , we obtain: 
113 
 
* 1 2 1 1 2
2 1 1 1 2
(2 ) ( (1 ) )
.
2 ( ( (1 ) ))
T G G G T G G
G T G T G
C
C
α β β γ α β β γ β γ
δ
β β γ β β γ β γ
− + − +
=
+ − +
    ( 80) 
This implies that when there are capacity constraints the league will serve a positive number of 
game-based fans only if there is enough capacity to serve a minimum number of team-based fans 
(i.e., * 0δ > if 2TC α> ).  Substituting the optimal value of *δ into the option and exercise 
prices we obtain the optimal option and exercise prices to be: 
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
( ( (2 ) ( (2 )(1 ) ) ( (1 ) )
(2 (1 ) ( ( (1 ) (1 2 ))))
2 (1 )( ( (1 ) )
T G G T G G T G G G
G G T G T G T G T GC
O
G G T G T G T G
C
P
γ α β β β β γ γ β β γ γ β γ β γ β γ
β β β γ α β β β γ β β γ β γ
β β β γ β β γ β β γ β γ
− + − − + − − + 
 − + + − − − =
− + − +
         
( 81) 
1 1
2 1 1
( )
2 2 (1 )
C G T G G T
G
G T G
P α γ α β α β
β β β γ
−
= −
−
              ( 82) 
Compared to the case without capacity constraints, the price of the option increases whereas the 
exercise price remains the same as in the unconstrained case. Intuitively, the value of a 
“reservation” on a seat is higher in the presence of capacity constraints – therefore the value of 
the option increases when there is limited capacity. However, because the fan already holds a 
reservation, the increased value of which is reflected in the option price, the exercise price 
remains unchanged. 
After substituting in the optimal prices and the optimal fraction of game-based fans who 
are served ( *δ ), option profits are: 
2 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2
2
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
( (1 ) ) 2 ( 2 ) ( (1 ) )
(4 ( ) ( 4 ( )( ) ) ))
4 ( ( (1 ) ))
G T G G G T G G T G G
G G T G T T G G T G G TC
OB
G G T G T G T G
C
C C C C
α β β γ β γ α α β β β γ β γ β γ
β β γ α β β α β β α β β β γ
π
β β β β β γ β β γ β γ
 − + − − − + +
 
− + + − −  =
+ − +
           
( 83) 
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Full Information Pricing 
Similar to the derivations in the aggregate demand model in chapter 2, we obtain the quantity 
demanded by game- and team-based fans using a standard vertical differentiation model:  
1 1 1G G Gq Pα β γ= − ,   1 1 1T T Tq Pα β γ= −          ( 84) 
The league can a maximum of C seats, or till the capacity is filled: 
1 1G TC q q= +       ( 85) 
We find the price that maximizes the capacity: 
1 1 1( ) ( )G T G TP Cα α β β= + − +       ( 86) 
Substituting eqn. ( 86) into the profit function of the league we obtain the optimal profits to be: 
1 1( ) ( )G T G TC Cπ α α β β= + − +         ( 87) 
If the unpopular game occurs the capacity is filled with game-based fans. Price and profits are: 
2 2( )G GP Cα β= − , 2( )G GC Cπ α β= −              ( 88) 
As in the advance selling case, full information prices are also higher in the presence of capacity 
constraints. Expected profits under full information pricing are given by: 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1( )( ) ( ( )( )) ( )CFB G G T T G G G G T G G TC C C Cπ α β β α β α β β β γ β β β= − + + − − − + +  ( 89) 
Profit comparisons 
The difference in profits between the option and advance selling the case ( C COB ABπ π− ) is: 
2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2( ( (1 ) )) 4 ( ( (1 ) ))T G G G T G G G G T G T G T Gα β β γ α β β γ β γ β β β β β γ β β γ β γ+ − + + − +  ( 90) 
Note that eqn. ( 90) is always positive – therefore, profits under option pricing when capacity 
constraints are considered always exceed profits under advance selling. Therefore, our basic 
result regarding the superiority of options in this region is unchanged in the presence of capacity 
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constraints. Next we compare profits under option pricing with expected profits under full 
information pricing: 
0C COB FBπ π− >  if 
2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( )(1 ) ( 2 )G G G G G T T G G G T G Tβ α β β β β γ α β γ α β β γ α β γ> + − − −  
and  21 1 1 1(2 )T G T G T Gα α β β β β> +                                                  ( 91) 
The intuition for this is as follows: If the utility of the game-based fan for the unpopular game is 
low (i.e., 2Gβ  is high) full information pricing loses the advantage of being able to extract profits 
separately in the case that the unpopular game occurs. Simultaneously, if the utility of the game-
based fan for the unpopular game is low the value of the option is high. Further, if there are 
sufficient team-based fans (i.e., Tα  is high) who do not purchase the ticket in the case that the 
unpopular game occurs, profits under full information pricing are low. Therefore, under these 
conditions, profits under option pricing can exceed expected profits under full information even 
in the presence of capacity constraints. 
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